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EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS
OF PROPERTY IN MISSOURI
I

INTRODUCTORY

Tho the Supreme Court of Missouri has been called upon
to handle a great volume of litigation concerning the construction
of deeds and wills during the past few years, many of the problems which continually arise in connection with the creation of
future interests in property are still subject to confusion in Missouri law. The court has been very diligent in its efforts to effectuate the intentions of grantors and testators in such litigation,
and has frequently gone very far toward effectuating real or supposed intentions not actually expressed.' But in an important
minority of cases, expressed intentions have been thwarted as a
result of the misapplication of some of the old rules of the common law restricting the creation of future interests. There has
been too little consideration of the reasons behind these rules,
and the court has not shown much disposition to avail itself of
the modern development of them outside of court opinions. The
result has been the establishment in Missouri law of some highly
artificial rules which defeat the very intentions to which the courts
have been enjoined to "have due regard. ' 2 For example, as the
writer has pointed out in an earlier number of the Law Series,'
the rule against perpetuities was so applied in Lockridge v. Mace4
and Shepperd v. Fisher5 as to invalidate limitations which have
frequently been upheld in other jurisdictions; and it has been sug1. See Bean v. Kemmuir (1885) 86 Mo. 666; Cross v. Hoch (1899)
149 Mo. 325; State ex rel. Farley v. Welsh (1913) 175 Mo. App. 303.
2. Since 1815, a statute has directed that all courts "concerned
in the execution of any last will or testament, shall have due regard
to the true intent and meaning of the testator." 1 Missouri Territorial
Laws, p. 411, now Revised Statutes 1909, § 583.
3. 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 23.
4. (1891) 109 Mo. 162.
S. (1907) 206 Mo. 208.
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gested in two Missouri decisions6 that the artificial rule of Whitby v. Mitchell,7 to the effect that any, limitation to an unborn
child following a limitation to its unborn parent is void, is a part
of Missouri law.8
The greatest uncertainty prevails with reference to limitations which cut short estates previously created and limitations
which are intended to have a future operation. The court con.tinues to repeat some of the old feudal maxims of the early
common law as if they still had life, and in some cases they have
been invoked to defeat expressed intentions, the effectuation of
which would violate no principle of public policy. It is common
to read in the current reports, for instance, that "a fee cannot
be limited on a fee" 9 and that "a freehold cannot be created in
futuro."'1 In numerous cases the court has accepted the doctrine
that any executory limitation after a fee simple is void if a general power of disposition is conferred on the taker of the fee
simple. Yet there has been almost no exposition of the reasons
for such a doctrine, and the numerous discussions of it elsewhere have apparently escaped the court's notice." Many members of the bar must have shared the delight with which the writer
greeted the opinion in Gibson v. Gibson 12 a few years ago and
ihe attempt there made to restate the doctrine as applied in Missouri decisions-many must also have shared his disappointment
that the actual decision in Gibson v. Gibson contributed so little
toward resolving the doubts left by the previous cases.
This study will deal with the present position of executory
limitations of real and personal property in Missouri law, which
6. Lockridge v. Mace (1891) 109 Mo. 162; Shepperd v. Fisher
(1907) 206 Mo. 208. See also Buxton v. Kroeger (1908) 219 Mo. 224.
7. (1890) 44 Ch. Div. 85.
8. See the writer's fulmination against this suggestion in 3
Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 29.
9. Green v. Sutton (1872) 50 Mo. 186; Cornwell v. Orton (1894)
126 Mo. 335; Walton v. Drumtra (1899) 152 Mo. 489.
10. See O'Day v. Meadows (1905) 194 Mo. 588, 621.
11. Professor Gray's very thoro analysis has become the classic
treatment of this topic. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 74
et seq. But it has not been referred to in the numerous decisions of
the Missouri court handed down since it was published.
12. (1911) 239 Mo. 490.

EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS OF PROPERTY IN MISSOURI

will involve a consideration of their validity at common law and
under the English statutes of uses and wills and under the Missouri statutes, and an analysis of the Missouri decisions. The
doctrine that any limitation after a fee simple to which is added
an absolute power of disposal is void, will be examined particularly, and an effort will be made to point out a way of escape
from it. The term executory limitation will be used with reference to the creation of executory interests'8 in real and personal
property by deed or by will; when contained in a will, such limitations will be called executory devises or bequests. The term
executory interests in its broad sense should be contrasted with
the term vested interests, and as such it includes contingent remainders; but it will be used in this study in the narrower technical sense which excludes all future interests capable of taking
effect as remainders. 14 It must be kept in mind that an executory interest may be either certain or contingent, but it can never
be vested. 15 It will be profitless to attempt a further definition
without a review of the early common law and the effect of the
statutes of uses and wills. The history of the subject makes it
necessary to treat separately of real property and of personal
property.
13. For an exhaustive classification of executory interests, see
Smith. Executory Interests, § 75. (Smith's work is published as the
second volume of Fearne's treatise on contingent remainders.)
14. "An executory devise is strictly such a limitation of a future
estate or interest in lands or chattels, tho in the case of chattels personal it is more properly an executory bequest, as the law admits in
the case of a will, tho contrary to the rules of limitation in conveyances at common law." Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 386. And
Butler adds in a note, "Its being contrary to the rules of limitation
in conveyances at common law, gives rise to two rules universally
adopted in respect to executory devises; that wherever a future interest is so limited by devise as to fall within the rules laid down for
the limitation of contingent remainders, or the estate limited by it
is such as can take effect as a contingent remainder, it shall never
take effect as an executory devise."
15. The similarity in nature between certain executory interests and vested remainders is frequently neglected. See Smith, Executory Interests, § 90. If A devises land to B from and after ten
years after his death, B takes a springing executory Interest tho the
date is certain; the effect is the same as if A had devised to his
heir for ten years, remainder to B. In the latter case B would be
said to have a vested remainder, or more properly, he should be said
to be seised subject to A's term. Cf. Scott v. Scott (1759) Ambl. 383.
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OF EXECUTORY

LIMITATIONS

IN

GENERAL

A. Of Real Property
1. At Common Law. While it is a familiar principle that
the early common law did not allow a fee to be limited on a fee,
the reason for it is frequently misstated. It was not because a
feoffor or a grantor had nothing remaining in himself to give
away after passing the biggest estate known to the law. 16 The
explanation is to be sought in the history of feudal tenure. The
early common law was developed'in a feudal society based on land
tenure and its theories concerning the creation of future interests in land were determined by the exigencies of tenure. 17 In
the feudal mind the conception of seisin occupied the important
place which in modern times we have given to the conception
of title. The feudal lord insisted that at all times some one should
be seised of his land, i. e., possessed of it under claim of such an
interest as would render him responsible to the lord for the performance of the feudal dues.' s Such a tenant, i. e., one seised of
a freehold, was the only person against whom a writ could be
directed in a real action. This importance ascribed to seisin led
to the establishment of the principles, first, that the seisin could
not be put in abeyance, and second, that no transfer of a present
freehold could be effected except by livery of seisin. The prohibition against placing the seisin in abeyance precluded the creation of future limitations unsupported by preceding estatesthus if A desired to convey to B from and after a future date,
the conveyance could not be effected by a present livery of seisin
for the seisin which would thereby pass to B would be in abeyance
until the time for B's enjoyment, and no other method of conveying a freehold was known to the common law. Hence was established the principle that a freehold could not be created to com16. Such an explanation Is given in Green v. Sutton (1872) 50
Mo. 186, where the court said that "when the fee-the whole estateIs disposed of nothing remains." See also Reinders v. Koppelmann
(1878) 68 Mo. 491; 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, 164.
17. The writer has expressed the opinion that tenure still exists
in Missouri In 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 4. But it does not
follow that the feudal rules must be applied.
18. Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) p. 100.
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mence in futuro. Furthermore, successive limitations were void if
they left the seisin in abeyance-if A enfeoffed B for life and attempted at the same time to convey to C and his heirs one year after B's death, the seisin would be in abeyance during that year and
the limitation to C was void. 19 It was for this reason that a remainder was required to fit immediately after the particular estate
without any gap between them. But the inhibition against placing the seisin in abeyance did not prevent a shifting of the seisin
from one person to another and it is difficult to find any logical
explanation of the common law rule that the seisin could not be
made to shift. If A enfeoffed B for life with a proviso that if B
should go into the army, the land should go to C and his heirs, C
took nothing-he had no remainder because it was an ineffectual
attempt to cut short B's life estate. So if A enfeoffed B and his
heirs with a proviso that if B should go into the army the land
should go to C and his heirs, C took nothing because the seisin
had passed to B from whom it could not be made to shift by A's
stipulation at the time of the feoffment. It was a consequence of
the early law's aversion to a shifting of the seisin that a remainder could not lap over the particular estate and that a fee could
not be limited on a fee. It was essential to a remainder that there
should be neither gap nor lap.
But the exigencies of seisin did not forbid a feoffor's creating certain future interests in himself. If A enfeoffed B for life,
B took the seisin for but a limited period after which it continued in A who had a reversion. If A enfeoffed B and his heirs
so long as a certain tree should stand, it could not be said definitely whether A had kept any certain interest, for the tree might
stand forever; so A's interest was denominated a possibility of
reverter.20 Such a possibility could not be created in C nor could
it be assigned to C subsequently to its creation in A. It did not
in any sense cut short B's estate, for A would not take until
after the expiration of B's estate. But A might have provided
19. Cf. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 918.
20. Possibilities of reverter may have been abolished by the
statute of Quia Emptores. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 31. Their
existence in Missouri today depends upon the existence of tenure and
the force of Quia Emptores. See 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 10.
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for B's estate to be cut short by annexing a condition subsequent,
for breach of which a right of entry could be reserved to A; but
such a right of entry could not be reserved or assigned to a stran21
ger.
At common law, therefore, the only future interests which
could be created in another than the feoffor himself were remainders. 22 After a time, contingent remainders were recognized;23
but the common law allowed no other executory, limitations. 24 A
conditional limitation was legally impossible, but the liberal enforcement of trusts by courts of equity without regard to the
restrictions prevailing at law paved the way for the introduction
of new legal future interests by the statute of uses.
2. Under the Statute of Uses. Before the enactment of the
statute of uses in 1536,25 it was possible to provide for a shifting of the beneficial enjoyment of land and for the future existence of beneficial interests by means of uses. The person clothed
with the legal estate held the seisin and was responsible for feudal
dues, and courts of equity proceeded to act upon his conscience
without regard to the artificial rules about abeyance of the seisin
and conveyance by livery of seisin. The statute of uses gave legal
sanction to the uses which equity had previously enforced, with
the result of making possible future dispositions of the seisin
which had previously been forbidden at law, tho it continued to
21.

See Kennett v. Plummer (1859)

22.

Cornelius v. Smith (1874) 55 Mo. 528, 532.

Missouri Bulletin, p. 13.

28 Mo. 142;

5 Law Series,
"As a matter of

history it is a mistake to think that a remainder is so called because

it Is what remains after a 'particular estate' has been given away."
"If after the expiration of one estate the land is not to come back
to the donor, but is to stay out for the benefit of another, then it
.remains' to that other." 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English
Law, p. 22. Blackstone's oft repeated statement about remainders is
not historically accurate and is misleading. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, 164.
23. The recognition of contingent remainders probably dates
from the fifteenth century. Williams, Real Property (17th Int. ed.)
p. 411. See 8 Illinois Law Review 231.
24. It seems unnecessary to include curtesy and dower in this
Professor Gray inclassification, tho strictly they are within it.
cludes them. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 5 et seq. See also a discussion of future interests at common law in Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 381, note.
25. 27 Henry VIII, c. 10.
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be impossible to put the seisin in abeyance. The use as it had been
known in equity was a light and nimble thing and it kept this
quality after the statute made it a legal interest. Hence after
the statute, in any conveyance to uses effected by any of the common law methods, or in any agreement to stand seised to uses
which could be effectuated either as a bargain and sale or as a
covenant to stand seised, it was possible to create executory
limitations without reference to the common law restrictions.
The ordinary feoffment was not changed by the statute, i. e., the
common law conveyances remained subject to the rules of the
common law so far as the creation of future interests was concerned. But if such a conveyance were made to uses, or if by
bargain and sale or covenant to stand seised a use were raised,
26
then the use could be made to spring or shift freely.
After the statute, if A enfeoffed B and his heirs from and
after a future date, B took nothing as before the statute. But
if A agreed for a consideration to stand seised to the use of B
and his heirs from and after a future date, B took a valid springing use in fee simple, and it was cognizable both at law and in
equity. Or to accomplish the same result, A might enfeoff X
and his heirs to the use of A and his heirs until the future date
and thereafter to the use of B and his heirs. If A agreed to
stand seised to his own use for life, and then to the use of B
and his heirs, the statute executed the uses so that A thereafter
had but a life estate. 27 Similarly, it has become possible to create a future estate which would have failed as a remainder at
common law. A may agree to stand seised to the use of B for
life and one year after B's death to the use of C and his heirs,
for upon the termination of B's life estate, the use will result
to A in fee and at the end of the year it will spring to C. Nor is
26. In Pollard v. Union National Bank (1877) 4 Mo. App. 408,
412, the court said that "it is almost a part of the definition of shifting and springing uses that they are contrary to the rules of the common law."
27. While the statute applies in terms only where one stands
seised to another's use, in such cases "equity supplies a common
law conveyance by holding the covenantor himself to be a trustee
and to stand seised to the use." Gilbert, Uses (Sugden's ed.) 150-152,
note, quoted in 1 Gray, Cases on Property (1st ed.) p. 505.
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the common law prohibition against shifting any longer important.
A may enfeoff X and his heirs to the use of B for life, but if
B should go into the army then to the use of C and his heirs, and
C will have a valid shifting use; or A may agree to stand seised
to the use of B and his heirs but if B should enter the army then
to C and his heirs. But as before the statute, if A enfeoffs B
and his heirs and provides that on an event the estate shall pass
to C and his heirs, C would have nothing.
The statute of uses thus made it possible to create a freehold
in futuro and to limit a fee on a fee, and to create future interests which were incapable of taking effect as remainders.
But the courts continued to approach every future limitation with a desire to effectuate it if possible as at common law
before the statute of uses-hence the principle that what can be
a remainder must be a remainder.
3. Under the Statute of Wills. The common law did not
permit a devise of lands, but for some time prior to the statute
of uses the devise of uses was permitted as a result of equity's
forcing the feoffee to uses to hold to the uses named in the will
of a feoffor or cestui que use. When the statute converted uses
into legal interests, the chancery courts discontinued their enforcement of the devises of uses. But soon afterward, in 1540, the
statute of wills authorized the devise of any socage lands "at the
free will and pleasure" of the tenants. 28 It was for some time
doubtful whether this statute permitted the creation of executory
interests by devise, but the doubt was dispelled by the decision of
the celebrated case of Hinde v. Lyon.29 Historically, the sanction
of executory devises may have antedated the recognition of executory interests limited in conveyances inter vivos under the statute of uses;3° but the same liberality and freedom from common
law restrictions were extended to both, and in view of the incompleteness of the statute of wills in this respect, this may have been
(1540) 32 Henry VIII, c. 1.
(1577) 3 Leonard 64.
Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) p. 170. Cf. Cornelius v.
Smith (1874) 55 Mo. 528, in which It was said that "the courts have
extended to these [family] settlements the same liberality of construction they have given to executory devises."
28.
29.
30.
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the result of an analogy, drawn between executory interests created in wills and those made possible by the statute of uses. It
would seem that no important distinction should be drawn between executory devises and executory limitations effected by
deed and that any future interest which is valid as an executory
devise should be valid as a springing or shifting use created by
an inter vivos conveyance, and conversely.3 1
4. Under Missouri Statutes. The common law as it was
adopted in Missouri in 181632 must have been as it was modified

by the statutes of uses and wills. Indeed, the English statute of
uses itself was included in the body of law adopted by the Missouri statute,"3 for it cannot within the terms of the Missouri
statute be said to have been "local to that kingdom"; the reenactment of the statute of uses in 182534 was therefore unnecessary
and effected no important changes. The English statute of wills
was not included because of the Missouri statute of wills, 35 but
the latter must be construed to permit the creation of future interests under the same restrictions which obtained under the
English statute of wills.
31.

But in Adams v. Savage (1703)

2 Salk. 679 (also reported In

Ld. Ray 854) and in Rawley v. Holland (1712) 22 Vin. Ab. 189, a use
limited by deed to a person not in esse after an estate for years was
held to be void. But these cases have been severely criticised by eminent writers. See an excellent article on "A point In the Law of Executory Limitations" by Challis, 1 Law Quarterly Review 412; Sugden, Powers (8th ed.) p. 35 et seq.; Sanders, Uses (Amer. ed.) 112.
In 21 Law Quarterly Review 261, Professor Kales attributes the decision in Adams v. Savage to the fact that it was decided when it
was not yet certain that the common law restrictions did not apply
to springing executory Interests created by deed.
32. 1 Missouri Territorial Laws, p. 436.
33. Guest v. Farley (1853) 19 Mo. 147.
34. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 215. The Missouri Statute copied
verbatim the efficacious words of the English statute. In 1835 a condensed statute was enacted without any important change in effect.
Revised Statutes 1835, p. 119. In 1845, the original wording was restored, but with the word "found" substituted for "from" In the expression "be found henceforth clearly deemed and adjudged". This
Is apparently a typographical error, and it was corrected In Laws of
1909, p. 901. The statute is now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2867.
35. A statute of 1807 authorized devises of lands. 1 Missouri
Territorial Laws, p. 131, § 18. It was reenacted in 1815. Ibid., p. 405,
§ 25. This statute follows the English statute of wills almost verbatim, in that it permits any tenant of land to devise "at his or
her will or pleasure." No other terms of the statute can refer to the
creation of future interests.
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There has been very little legislation to affect executory interests since the adoption of the common law. In 1825, the rule
in Shelley's case was abolished as to devises,8 6 and in 1845 it was
completely abolished as to both deeds and wills. 87 A statute
of 1845 provided that "where a remainder ....shall be limited
to take effect on the death of any person without heirs, or heirs
of his body or without issue," it should be construed
as a definite failure of issue.3 8 In 1845 the necessity of a contingent remainder's fitting immediately on the particular estate
was relaxed as to posthumous children, 39 tho the Supreme Court
has since held in Aubuchon v. Bender4° that this statute "was
but an affirmance of what had already become the law;"41 and
in the statute to this effect there was appended, apparently as a
rider, for it has no relevancy to what preceded, 42 the provision
that, "hereafter, an estate of freehold, or inheritance, may be
36. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 794. See 1 Law Series, Missouri
Bulletin, p. 10, note 35.
37. Revised States 1845, c. 32, § 7. See Tesson v. Newman (1876)
62 Mo. 198.
38. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 6; now Revised Statutes 1909,
I 2873. Unlike the English statute from which it was copied, 1 Victoria, c. 26, § 29, this Missouri statute makes no exception where a
contrary intention is expressed.

39. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 9; now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 2876. The Statute is fashioned on the English statute of 1699, 10
& 11 William III, c. 16.
40. (1869) 44 Mo. 560, 569.
41. The Missouri court relied upon the decision of the House of
Lords in Reeve v. Long (1694) 3 Levinz 408, reversing the King's Bench
decision in 1 Salk. 227. But it should have been noted that the remainder in Reeve v. Long was created in a devise. The English statute, tho due to the judges' dissatisfaction with the decision of the
House of Lords in Reeve v. Long, did not mention remainders created
in wills. In a note to Coke, Littleton, 298a, Butler says that "there
is a tradition that as the case of Reeve v. Long arose upon a will,
the Lords considered the law to be settled by their determination in
that case; and were unwilling to make any express mention of limitations or devises made in wills, lest it should appear to call in question the authority or propriety of their determination." The Missouri
statute mentions only conveyances; it was not enacted at the time
of the execution of the deed in Aubuchon v. Bender, so that the decision
in that case extends Reeve v. Long to inter vivos conveyances independently of statute.
42. This irrelevancy was pointed out in O'Day v. Meadows (1905)
194 Mo. 588, 621.
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'4 3
made to commence in future by deed, in like manner as by will."

It seems probable that the addition of this clause was due to a
failure to appreciate the possibility of creating executory limitations in inter vivos conveyances by way of springing and shifting uses. Estates of freehold or inheritance were already susceptible of being created in futuro by any deed which operated
as a bargain and sale or as a covenant to stand seised or as a common law conveyance to uses, 44 and in view of the fact that most

if not all conveyances then operated either by way of bargain and
sale or covenant to stand seised, there would seem to have been
no need for this legislation. But as the writer has shown in a
previous number of the Law Series, 45 it was in 1845 and is now
possible to have a conveyance operate as a feoffment and the statute under consideration made possible the creation of such freeholds in futuro by such a conveyance or by a surrender or exchange without the employment of uses; and taken together with
the statute of 1865 authorizing statutory grants, 4 6 it authorizes the
creation of freeholds in futuro by statutory grant. 47 There can be
no doubt about the possibility of creating springing future interests
under this statute; but as to shifting interests the case is not so
clear. The provision for a freehold to commence in futuro may
not include shifting interests, i. e., it may have reference only to
deeds which create estates which are limited to begin at a future
time and not to deeds which create interests limited to cut short
other estates created at the same time. But even if such a distinction were made in applying the statute, it would be of small consequence except for the doubt in the decisions as to the possibility of creating shifting interests by a conveyance to uses
43. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 9, now Revised Statutes 1909, §
2876.
44. Allen v. DeGroodt (1891) 105 Mo. 442.
45. 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 11.
46. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 1, now Revised Statutes
1909, § 2787.
47. See 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 21. It may be contended that the statute of 1865 authorizes the transfer but not the
creation of future interests by statutory grant. This may be supported
by the argument that the statute was not enacted to change the
rules of limitation, but merely to afford a new method of conveyance.
But Cf. Abbott v. Holway (1881) 72 Maine 304, cited in O'Day v.
Meadows (1905) 194 Mo. 588, 623.
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or a conveyance operating under the statute of uses. It can not
be contended that the statute operated as a restriction on existing methods of creating future estates.
This statute concerning the creation of freeholds in futuro
"by deed, in like manner as by will", was considered by the Supreme Court in O'Day v. Meadows, 4 8 in which the conveyance
in question clearly operated as a bargain and sale because of the
expressed consideration. 4 9 The court purported to hold that the
statute applied, but it is clear that the mode of operation of
the conveyance was misconceived, and that in view of its operating as a bargain and sale there was no necessity of relying on the
statute. The case is therefore of little authority;50 the court's
statement that it was enacted "to change the common law rules
applicable to conveyances," seems to have been made without any
understanding of the change actually effected.
5. Under Missouri Decisions. The cases have not emphasized
the distinction between ,executory interests created by will and
those created by deed. But in view of the foregoing survey the
distinction must be borne in mind during a study of the decisions.
The statement that a fee cannot be limited on a fee has frequently been repeated in the opinions, but the decisions have
robbed it of its meaning. In Faust v. Birner5 1 there was a devise
48. (1905) 194 Mo. 588.
49. The conveyance in O'Day v. Meadows was expressed to be
made in consideration of one dollar, which was sufficient to raise the
use. On the requisites of a bargain and sale, see 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 19. O'Day v. Meadows was cited in Buxton v. Kroe.
ger (1908) 219 Mo. 224, 256, for the proposition that it is not necessary
"that there should be any estate created between the end of the life
estate and the vesting of the estate in remainder." But it is clear that
It stands for no such proposition.
50. In Aldridge v. Aldridge (1906) 202 Mo. 565, the court referred to this statute and said that "it Is essential to the validity of
a deed purporting to convey such an estate that the right to the future estate conveyed vest in the grantee Immediately tho possession
be deferred." But this must not be taken to mean that the future
estate may not be contingent, tho there must be a certain right to
the estate on the happening of the contingency. Christ v Kuehne (1902)
172 Mo. 118.
51. (1860) 30 Mo. 414. At the death of the testator his widow
was encient of a child which was never born alive. The remainder
to that child may be neglected since a stillborn child will be taken
never to have lived at all. Marseilis v. Thalheimer (1830) 2 Paige 35.
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to the testator's widow for life with remainder in fee to her children by any husband whom she might later marry, but a proviso
that if the wife died without issue the land should be divided between the testator's brothers. The testator's widow remarried
and had three children and her husband was induced to pay a
certain sum to the testator's brothers for an interest which they
claimed to have under the will and which they purported to convey to him. The wife sued as administratrix of the second husband to recover the sum so paid. The trial court had instructed
the jury that "by a plain and settled principle of law the defendants had no interest in the land in question under the will." In
reversing and remanding the case, the Supreme Court said that
it was a "good executory devise to the brothers. 5 2s Tho it may
be doubted whether this was an executory devise, 53 the decision
is a clear recognition of the possibility of future interests created by executory devise.
In Jecko v. Taussig,5 4 it was admitted that "a fee simple
may be granted in such a way and upon such conditions that it
may be defeated by the happening of some future event," and the
court seems to have had in mind a conditional limitation after a
fee simple. But some doubt was thrown on this by the statement
in Cornelius v. Smith55 that "under the old common law convey52. The court held that as an executory devise It was saved from
remoteness by the statute making all failures of issue definite. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 67; now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2873.
But this statute in terms applies only where remainders are so limited.
See 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 10; Naylor v. Godman (1891)
109 Mo. 543; Yocum v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281.

53. No attention was given by the court in Faust v. Birner to
the principle that what can be a remainder must be a remainder instead of an executory devise. Smith, Executory Interests, p. 71. Applying this principle, it would seem that at the death of the testator
his widow had a life estate, with a contingent remainder to her children to be born and an alternate contingent remainder to the testator's brothers. Whether this latter can become a good executory devise is a question of considerable nicety. A similar question arises in
applying the Missouri statute concerning estates tail; it has been
discussed in an article on "Estates Tail In Missouri" in 1 Law Series,
Missouri Bulletin, p. 27.
54. (1869) 45 Mo. 167. It is not clear that a life estate with a
power to convey the fee was not created in Jecko v. Taussig. Vide post,
p. 38.
65. (1874) 55 Mo. 528.
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ances an estate could not be limited to a stranger to the deed,
except by way of remainder, and it may be that a legal title cannot be created in a stranger to a deed under the statute of uses."
In the latter case, there was a bargain and sale to A and her heirs
with a proviso that if B should pay certain sums and keep his
father during life the land should go to B and his heirs, otherwise
it should go to the heirs of B's father. 6 B failed to perform
the conditions and the court treated A as trustee for the heirs of
B's father, tho the executory limitation would seem to have been
good as a shifting use executed by the statute and the heirs ought
to have been held to have had the legal estate.
The validity of an executory devise seems to have been
assumed in Harbison v. Swan,57 but the point was not specially
considered. In Pollard v. Union National Bank,5 8 the St. Louis
Court of Appeals gave very careful consideration to the creation
of future interests after the statute of uses. There Was a bargain
and sale to A and his heirs in trust for B, and if C survived B
then to C, otherwise the "property shall remain in [B and her
heirs] subject to her absolute control and disposition." No question was raised as to the execution of the use in B and C, 59 but it
was held that the executory limitation to C was good. It was
contended that C took nothing because of the attempt to limit a
fee upon a fee, but the court answered that such arguments, "so
56.

B's father had caused the land to be conveyed by one who held
his use (tho it was not manifested in writing). On the right
of B to share in the gift in default of his supporting his father, cf. Holloway v. Holloway (1800) 5 Ves. 399; Welch v. Brimmer (1897) 169
Mass. 204.
57. (1874) 58 Mo. 147. See the comment on Harbison v. Swan
in 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 30.
58. (1877) 4 Mo. App. 408.
59. It Is frequently overlooked that If A bargains and sells to B
to the use of C, the statute of uses executes only B's use and not C's.
Guest v. Farley (1853) 19 Mo. 147; Roberts v. Moseley (1873) 51 Mo.
282, 287; 2 Sanders, Uses, p. 52; Matthews v. Ward (1839) 10 Gill & J.
(Md.) 443. See 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 20. A consideration of this point should not have changed the result in Pollard v.
Union National Bank. But a use after a use will be executed by the
statute; as where A bargains and sells to B for life, remainder to C
and his heirs, both B's and C's uses are executed. This difference
between a use after a use and a use on a use was overlooked by
MARSHALL J., in his dissenting opinion in Cornwell v. Wulff (1898)
148 Mo. 542, 583.

subject to
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far as they tend to show that the limitation is not in accordance
with the common law rules relating to contingent remainders, are
irrelevant, as it is not contended that the limitation would have
been good independently of the doctrine of uses." This decision
clearly upholds a shifting executory limitation created by deed.
The Supreme Court conceded in Wead v. Gray,60 by way of
dictum, "that by will, there may be a limitation ot a future estate
or interest in land or personal property which cannot consistently, within the rules of law, take effect as a remainder but may
notwithstanding be upheld as an executory devise." Yet two
years later, in Bean v. Kenmuir, 1 the court seems to have been
unanimous in admitting that in a deed of bargain and sale
to A and her heirs and assigns with a limitation over to A's
husband in the event of A's death, the limitation over would be
void if the deed were construed to confer on A a fee simple instead of a life estate; and the decision that A took but a life
estate seems to have been the result of this misconception.
The possibility of a limitation after a fee by way of executory devise was clearly admitted in Chew v. Keller 2 tho it was
held that no future estate had been created. A clearly valid executory devise limited on an event which did not happen was
called a remainder in Prosser v. Hardesty,"3 and the court seems
to have been willing to uphold it as such; the point received but
60. (1883) 78 Mo. 59. Also reported in (1880) 8 Mo. App. 515.
61. (1885) 86 Mo. 666. It Is to be noted that the opinion of the
court, in which three judges concurred, was written by one of two
dissenting judges; but there seems to have been no dissent on the
proposition stated in the text, for the dissenting judges concluded

that the limitation over was "inoperative and void."

No power of

disposition was found in the word "assigns"; but cf, Gannon v. Pauk
(1906) 200 Mc. 75, 88.
62. (1889) 100 Mo. 362. In Cornwell v. Wulff (1898) 148 Mo.
542, 549, GANTT, C. J., compared Chew v. Keller with Pells v. Brown
(1620) Cro. Jac. 590. See also Gaven v. Allen (1889) 100 Mo. 293, in
which the court seems to have recognized the validity of an executory
devise which would divest an estate given to the testator's widow on
her remarriage; the widow was said to have a "base or qualified fee."
63. (1890) 101 Mo. 593.
2
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scant consideration, however. In Naylor v. Godman,6 4 there was a
devise to A for life with remainder in fee to his children and a
limitation over in the event of his death without issue. A died
without issue and it was not shown that he had ever had issue.
The court said that the limitation over was good as an executory
devise, but it seems quite clear that it took effect as a remainder. 65
It is difficult to determine from the opinions in the famous
Cornwell cases 6 what the attitude of the Supreme Court was at
a deed. In
that time on the possibility of executory limitations in,
Cornwell v. Orton, GANTT, J., who wrote the court's opinion,
seems to have thought that because no remainder can be created
after a fee simple, any limitation upon a fee was void. But
four years later, when the same learned judge wrote the majority opinion in Cornwell v. Wulff he seems to have made a more
careful investigation and was ready to recognize the possibility
of an executory limitation by way of springing or shifting use or
executory devise. In the later opinion he referred to Pells v.
Brown,6 7 which is the most famous case on executory devises,
and said erroneously that Chew v. Keller was "just such a case."
But the dissenting judges 8 in Cornwell v. Wulff seem to have
failed to recognize the possibility of an executory limitation
after a fee simple even in the absence of a power of disposal.
In Walton v. Drumtra119 the majority of the court held that
the deed created a valid equitable remainder after an equitable
64. (1891) 109 Mo. 543. Tho the testator died in Kentucky, it
is not shown that he was domiciled there at the time of his death,
so that the provision of the will was construed according to Missouri
law. The land in question was purchased by the executor under the
directions of the will and it passed as tho it had been devised in the
will.
65. If children had been born to A, they would have had a vested

remainder and the limitation over must, during their lives, have been

an executory devise, if it was valid at all. This involves the question
discussed supra, in note 53.
66. Cornwell v. Orton (1894) 126 Mo. 355; Cornwell v. Wulff
(1898) 148 Mo. 542.
,67. (1620) Cro. Jac. 590.
68. MARSHALL, SHERWOOD, and BRACE, JJ. MARSHALL, J., who
wrote the opinion, said that "logically one who has given all he has
to another has nothing more to give to a third party. This was the
reason underlying the old doctrine that a fee cannot be limited on
a fee."
69. (1899) 152 Mo, 489,
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life estate, but by what was apparently a slip, it was called an
executory limitation. 70 In his concurring opinion, MARSHALL, J.,
said that all of the judges agreed that "a fee can not be limited
upon a fee," which would seem to have amounted to a denial of
the possibility of an executory limitation after a fee simple. The
possibility of an executory devise after a definite failure of issue
was clearly recognized in Yocum v. Siler,7 1 tho the event upon
which it was to take effect had not happened. In Hoselton v.
Hoselton,72 a testator devised lands to his son as long as the son
should pay the taxes on them or cause them to be paid, and "in
the case of the failure to pay taxes, the land to go to his four
children" named. The named children sought to recover the land
from their father's second wife who claimed a homestead. The
testator's son failing to pay taxes, they were paid by his second
wife. The counsel did not contend that the first devisee took but
a life estate, but admitted that he took a fee and contended that
the limitation was void. The court admitted the validity of the
limitation over, calling it a conditional limitation,7 3 but held that
the condition had not happened.
After the decision of the cases referred to, one would have
thought it clear that an executory devise is good in Missouri. The
70. It could not have been an executory limitation cutting short
the legal estate in the trustee, for the court expressly recognized that
the trustee had a duty to convey the legal title to the holder of the
future interest-the latter must therefore have had an equitable interest. The trust was active and not executed by the statute of uses.
71. (1900) 160 Mo. 281. See also Yocum v. Parker (1904) 134
Fed. 265. MARSHALL, J., dissenting in Yocum v. Siier, seems to have
thought that no executory devise could be made after a fee simple.
72. (1901) 166 Mo. 182.
73. Dumey v. Schoeffler (1857) 24 Mo. 170, also recognizes such
a conditional limitation as valid. Cf. Farrarv. Christy (1857) 24 Mo.
453. On the distinction between conditions subsequent and conditional
limitations see 5 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 8. The term conditional limitation when used by the Missouri courts has usually meant
either a shifting use or a shifting executory devise. A conditional
limitation should be sharply distinguished from a special limitation.
If A conveys to B and his heirs so long as the University of Missouri
is located at Columbia, B holds subject to a special limitation and his
interest is properly called a determinable fee. If A conveys to B and
his heirs provided that if the University of Missouri is moved from
Columbia, then to C and his heirs, B holds subject to a conditional
limitation and C takes a shifting use. Strictly speaking, B does not
get a determinable fee in the latter case, tho it is often called such.
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dicta in Simmons v. Cabanne74 are therefore nothing short of startling. 75 After a devise to trustees for his children, a testator had
made a limitation over to his brothers in the event of his children's
death under twenty-one without issue. The court said that if the
will were construed to confer on the testator's children life estates,
with fee simple remainders in the grandchildren, "then the attempt to pass the fee to the brothers of the testator upon all his
sons' dying without issue within the age of twenty-one years,
would be limiting a fee upon a fee, or rather, and worse still,
would amount to limiting the entire fee to two different persons
or sets of persons at the same time"; and that if the testator's sons
had been given an equitable fee simple, "then the attempt to limit
the fee to the testator's brothers would be void for repugnancy."
These dicta are the pronouncements of the court en banc, thru the
the same judge who had expressed similar misconceptions in Cornwell v. Wulff and Yocum v. Siler.
The validity of an executory devise was admitted in Cannon
v. Pauk,76 tho the event upon which it was to vest did not happen.
So, too, in Gannon v. Albriqht,77 where the court was clearly of
78
the opinion that the statute making failures of issue definite
applies as well where executory devises as where remainders are
On the use of these terms by various writers, see Gray, Restraints on

Alienation (2d ed.) § 22, note; Smith, Executory Limitations, § 148.
Whether there may be an executory limitation after a determinable
fee, presents a question of great nicety. Mr. Challis answers it in the
affirmative. Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) p. 173. To the same effect
is Smith, Executory Interests, § 126, but Smith is careful to speak
of it as a springing interest. Ibid, § 165. See the valuable discussion
of the topic in Tiffany, Real Property, § 135, note. The will in Hoselton v. Hoselton really created on this theory, a determinable fee simple,
i. e., a fee subject to a special limitation, and the gift over operated as
a springing executory limitation. Some writers, notably Gray, do not
recognize the possibility of a determinable fee since the statute of
Quia Emptores was enacted in 1290. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 32.
See Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 125. To them, therefore, the
limitation over in Hoselton v. Hoselton would have been a conditional
limitation.
74. (1903) 177 Mo. 336, 352.
75. Professor Gray speaks of them as "remarkable" in his classic
book. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 68a, note.
76. (1904) 183 Mo. 265, 273, (1906) 200 Mo. 75.
77. (1904) 183 Mo. 238.
78. Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 6; now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 2873.
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limited. 79 Kessner v. Phillipss0 involved the validity of certain
restraints on alienation, and in speaking of spendthrift trusts, the
court said that "such limitations or conditions cannot be grafted
upon a fee simple, because they are repugnant to the absolute ownership incident to the fee." But the true reason would seem to
be founded in the public policy which demands free alienability.
It is submitted that it was largely due to a misconception
of executory devises that a monstrous result was reached in Shepperd v. Fisher.s ' There was a devise to trustees for the testator's
daughter Mary for life and "at her death to her bodily heirs, if
the said bodily heirs have issue, forever, but should the said bodily
heirs of the said Mary die without issue, then this estate is to
revert to this grantee [devisor], his heirs, assigns, or legal representatives." It would seem clear that Mary took a life estate,
with a remainder in fee to her bodily heirs subject to an executory devise to the heirs of the testator in the event of Mary's
bodily heirs' dying without issue; the executory devise being void
for remoteness, it failed altogether and its failure should have left
the bodily heirs' remainder in fee undivested. s 2 But the, court
held that the bodily heirs took but a life- estate,8 3 "liable to be enlarged into a fee by the birth unto them of the 'issue' referred to
'
in the will."84

The court neglected the fact that issue born to the

79. See also Naylor v. Godman (1891) 109 Mo. 543; and Yocum
v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281. An executory devise was held valid in
McCune v. Goodwillie (1907) 204 Mo. 306, and in O'Day v. O'Day (1905)
193 Mo. 62.
80. (1905) 189 Mo. 515.
81. (1907) 206 Mo. 208. The writer has pointed out the misapplication of the rule against perpetuities made in Shepperd v. Fisher,
in 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 14.
82. "If there be no executory devise to take effect on the happening of the condition on which the fee wag to determine, or no one to
take it, the fee is not cut down but remains, unless there is something
else in the will to show that the intention of the testator was that the
fee should determine absolutely on the happening of the condition with
reference to the devise over." VALLIANT J., in Sullivan v. Garesche
(1910) 229 Mo. 496. See also Yocum v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281, 299.
83. For this the court cited a dissenting opinion in Yocum v.
Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281, 313, 314, 315; it is submitted that the majority opinion in Yocum v. Slier Is authority to the contrary.
84. It is true that the common law recognized the enlargement
of estates on condition. Coke, Littleton, 217b; Lord Stafford's Case,
8 Coke Rep. 74; Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 279; Smith, Exeeutory Interests, § 137. More recent writers such as Leake, Challis,
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bodily heirs might have predeceased them, and it seems to have
failed to apply the well established rule favoring vested rather than
contingent interests.8
Whatever doubt may have existed as to the validity of executory devises after Simmons v. Cabanne, ought to have been dispelled by the opinion in Sullivan v. Garesche.5 6 There was a
devise to the testatrix's daughters, Kate and Julia with a proviso
that "in event of the death of both before marriage, said property
shall be divided equally among my surviving children." It was
held that the claimant was not the heir of a "surviving" child and
therefore had no interest in the land as such; further, that he
had no reversionary interest as heir of the testatrix since Kate and
Julia took a fee simple which could be divested on the event
named only in favor of surviving children who had a contingent
executory devise. In other words the court held that Kate and
Julia took a fee simple subject to a contingent executory. devise,
the contingency being the double one of their deaths unmarried
and of the survival of at least one of the executory devisees, and
that their fee simple would not be divested unless both parts of
the contingency happened, and on the facts in Sullivan v. Garesche
this had not occurred. While it would be consistent with the result of this decision to say that the executory devise was void, the
opinion unequivocally stamps it as valid and it is so clear that
the matter ought at last to be free from doubt. And this seems
7
to have been the opinion of the court itself in Brown v. Tuschoff8
and in Buckner v. Buckner.8s
Washburn and Gray, seem to have given no attention to the point.
The enlargement as described by Coke, seems to have been no more
than a merger of a particular estate in a future estate created by release which operated as an executory grant. The merger did not occur
until the condition happened. In Shepperd v. Fisher, it was unnecesary to resort to such circumvention for the fee simple of the bodily
heirs should have been held to be vested subject to being divested,
since the law favors vested estates. Edwards v. Hammond (1683) 3
Levinz 132.
85. Chew v. Keller (1889) 100 Mo. 362.
86. (1910) 229 Mo. 496.
87. (1911) 235 Mo. 449.
88. (1913) 255 Mo. 371.
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We may safely say, therefore, that in spite of the dictum in
Simmons v. Cabanne, an executory limitation, either springing or
shifting, is now valid in Missouri when created in a will.8 9
It would seem that there should be no doubt as to the
possibility of creating a springing executory interest by deed
operating as a bargain and sale or as a covenant to stand seised,
or, since the statute permitting an estate of freehold to be made
to commence in futuro by deed as by will, by any conveyance which
would have been good at common law apart from uses or which
would now be good as a statutory grant. Since the decision of
O'Day v. Meadows,9" the Supreme Court will probably be very
liberal in allowing future springing interests.
A conveyance to take effect at the death of the grantor seems
to be subject to exceptional scrutiny, however. No one will contend that a deed can be made to accomplish the effect of a will.
The chief distinction between a will and a deed is that the former
remains ambulatory until the maker's death and may be changed as
he pleases. If it is clear that an, instrument is not intended to
be ambulatory but binding from the time of execution, it is not
testamentary and it should be upheld as a deed wherever possible.
But in Murphy v. Gabbert91 the test was stated to be whether
the instrument "is to take effect in presenti or after the death
of the maker." This test is misleading in that it may be applied
to exclude the creation of a present right to a future interest.
If A conveys to B from and after the next presidential election,
the conveyance operates presently to give B a present right to a
89. It is to be noted that where there is a devise to a class, the
members of which are subject to future determination it will frequently be necessary to support the gift as a shifting executory devise.

If for instance, the devise is to A for life, with remainder to B's children to be born before or after A's death, the first child born during
A's life will take a vested remainder at the time of its birth, and this
vested remainder will open up to let in after-born children, some of
whom tho incapable of taking by way of remainder may take by executory devise. This was plainly recognized in Buckner v. Buckner
(1913) 255 Mo. 371. See also Thomas v. Thomas (1899) 149 Mo. 426;
Gates v. Seibert (1900) 157 Mo. 254.
90. (1905) 194 Mo. 588. A valid springing interest seems to
have been created in Allen v. De Groodt (1891) 105 Mo. 442.
91. (1901) 166 Mo. 596. A will was very clearly intended In
Miller V. Holt (1878) 68 Mo. 584.
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future estate quite as clearly as if A conveyed to C for life and
then to B. In the latter case B has a vested remainder, which is
a present right to a future estate; whereas in the former case,
B has a springing executory interest, which is a present right
to a future interest. Both are to take effect in the future in the
sense that B is not to have the possession until a future time.
The instrument in question in Murphy v. Gabbert stated that "the
intention of this instrument of writing is such that Mrs. Ann
Ellison [the maker] relinquishes her entire right at her death,
then this deed is to immediately come into effect, but not until
then." It was a queer process of reasoning which led the court
to hold that "no interest was presently conveyed thereby which
interfered with the life estate of the grantor, and if any effect
whatever is to be given to the words of reservation they limited
the fee to take effect on the death of the grantor and not before,
that is, they limited the estate to take effect in futuro, which at
common law can be done only when an estate is granted." The
instrument seems to have been held a will because it was inoperative as a deed. But it is submitted that it was a good bargain and
sale of a springing interest and that the decision was due to a neglect of the statute of uses as well as of the statute as to freeholds
92

in futuro.

But in Christ v. Kuehne, 3 decided one year later, the court
seems to have corrected the error, for tho Murphy v. Gabbert
was not cited and the instrument contained a more equivocal
phraseology, it seems impossible to reconcile the decision in Christ
v. Kuehne with the test applied in Murphy v. Gabbert. It is
difficult to see just what was the ground upon which the court decided Christ v. Kuehne; the maker of the instrument conveyed
from and after his death to his wife for her life and after her
death to his own heirs at law. It seems clear that the title remained in the grantor subject to a springing executory limitation
92. Murphy v. Gabbert was said to have been rightly decided In
O'Day v. Meadows (1905) 194 Mo. 588, 620. And the decision in Aidridge v. Aldridge (1906) 202 Mo. 565, seems to support it.
93. (1902) 172 Mo. 118. Murphy v. Gabbert and Christ v. Kuehne
were decided by different divisions of the Supreme Court, composed
of different Judges.
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to his wife for life and a springing executory limitation 94 to his
heirs after her death, 5 which latter would become a remainder
when the estate vested in the wife. But the court spoke of the interest of the grantor's heirs as a remainder even during the life of
the grantor-this cannot be technically exact unless the conveyance be given the effect of creating a life estate in the grantor,
followed by a remainder for life in his wife and a remainder
in his heirs. This was recognized in Dozier v. Toalson9 6 where
it seems to have been held that the deed had the effect of creating a life estate in the grantor and a vested remainder in the
grantee. The court went upon the ground that a life estate was
reserved by the grantor. It recognized the distinction between
an exception and a reservation 9 7 and said in effect that the life
estate was a new right issuing out of the thing granted. It is
obvious that if this had been possible at common law the effect
of a freehold in futuro would have been possible, but in a strict
sense no life estate could be reserved at common law because
an actual change of possession by means of livery of seisin was
required for the creation of any new estate.9 8 Whether the Missouri statute authorizing conveyancing without livery of seisin
has changed this rule of the common law would seem to be doubtful. A more proper method of reaching the result of Dozier v.
Toalson would be this: since the deed operated by way of bargain and sale, the grantor may have agreed to stand seised to his
own use for life and then, to the use of the grantee in fee; the
94. If A conveys to B and his heirs with a provision that on an
event the estate is to shift to C for life and after C's death to D and
his heirs both C and D have executory Interests and D cannot properly
be said to have a remainder until after the happening of the event,
at which time his executory interest becomes a remainder.
95. There is no sound objection to the creation of a springing
or shifting interest in persons not in esse. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d
ed.) § 61 et seq. But the point is by no means clear on the authorities.
Christ v. Kuehne is authority for allowing a springing executory limitation to persons not in esse. Cf. Thomas v. Wyatt (1860) 31 Mo. 188.
96. (1904) 180 Mo. 546.
97. As made in Snoddy v. Bolen (1894) 122 Mo. 486. In other
states it has been said that the grantor may reserve a life estate, but
as pointed out in Tiffany, Real Property, § 134, this is technically
inexact.
98.

Kales, Future Interests, § 158a.

be reserved.

Rents are properly said to
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statute would execute the use, tho this seems illogica99 and the
result of the application of the statute would be that the grantor
would be seised of the life estate with the remainder in fee to the
grantee. It would seem, however, that there should be an expressed intention on the part of the grantor to stand seised to his
own use for life. If by force of the bargain and sale the legal
title were to pass immediately to the grantee, the grantee might
hold in trust for the grantor, but in this event there could be no
legal life estate in the grantor for the statute, having executed
a use in the grantee, would be exhausted. Nor is it possible to
support a legal life estate in the grantor on any theory of resulting
use, for if the use results it tesults in fee.
The better explanation would seem to be that by force of
the deed of bargain and sale a future springing use is created
in the grantee. The grantor remains seised of the fee simple,
which upon his death will immediately spring to the grantee. This
is not objectionable as a testamentary disposition, for it would
take effect at the time of the execution of the deed in the sense
that the grantee would become entitled to an executory interest
which would operate in the future by a springing of the use. This
explanation is the view adopted in Vinson v. Vinson'00 where
it is expressed with exceeding clearness.
It is important which of these views is adopted in at least
one class of cases. If the grantor were to marry after executing
the deed, his wife would not be entitled to dower if he was
seised of only a life estate; but if the grantor be conceived to
be seised of the fee subject to the springing use, then his wife
will have dower."" 1 It would have made no difference in the
result of Dozier v. Toalson, however, for the grantee's husband
was not entitled to curtesy whether the grantee had a vested
99. Vide ante, note 27; Gilbert, Uses (Sugden's ed.) 150, 152.
But see Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 930, note.
100. (1879) 4 I1. App. 138. See also Shackelton v. Sebree (1877)
86 Ill. 616.
101. Buckwvorth v. Thirkell (1785) 1 Coll. Juris. 322; Moody v.
King (1825) 2 Bing. 447; Kales, Future Interests, § 158b; Tiffany, Real
Property, § 183; 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) p. 1453.
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remainder or an executory, springing interest, in view of the
fact that the grantor did not die until after the death of the
grantee.102

102. Cf. Martin v. Trail (1897) 142 Mo. 85.
The flood of litigation since Murphy v. Gabbert seems to indicate
that the bar was taken unawares by that decision. It had been preceded by but one case, Miller v. Holt (1878) 68 Mo. 584, in which the
instrument purporting to be a will was never actually delivered, and
was of course held to be testamentary; but much litigation followed
swiftly upon the heels of Murphy v. Gabbert. In Griffin v. McIntosh
(1903) 176 Mo. 392, the instrument, tho called a deed, contained a
provision that the grantor should hold it in his possession until his
death and the court relied upon the fact that it was so kept and held
that there had been no delivery. In Aldridge v. Aldridge (1902) 202
Mo. 565, a grantor purported to conveyto his wife for life, remainder
to his son. The deed contained the condition however, that if the grantor
should outlive his wife the land should revert to him in fee and if he
should predecease his wife, then she should hold for life, remainder
to the son in fee. The court held that it was the intention to make a
testamentary disposition and that the instrument had no effect as a
deed. In Givens v. Ott (1909) 222 Mo. 395, the instrument provided
that it should not "take effect until the death of the grantor". The
court gave little consideration to the point but held that the deed was
invalid as such, but there were many other grounds for the decision.
In Terry v. Glover (1911) 235 Mo. 544, the court held that there was
no delivery of the instrument, and it was entirely obiter that it was
said to be testamentary in nature because of the clause providing "this
deed not to go into effect until after the death of" the grantor. In
Sims v. Brown (1913) 252 Mo. 58 the instrument was in form a will,
and it was contended that it operated as a deed as of the time of its
execution, but it Is very clear from the form of the instrument and
from the power reserved by the person who executed It over parts of
his property that it was intended to be testamentary in its nature.
In Priest v. McFarland, (1914) 262 Mo. 229, the words of the instrument do not appear in the report. The court states that it "expressly
reserves a life estate in the grantor and conveys at the same time, by
words of present import, a vested remainder in the property to the
grantees." It recited that the instrument should become absolute and
fully convey the title after the death of the grantor. The court held
that it operated as a deed at the time of its execution and the decision
with reference to the future interest seems to sustain the result of
Dozier v. Toalson. In Goodale v. Evans (1914) 263 Mo. 219, the instrument was in all respects an ordinary deed of bargain and sale, but it
contained the provision that the grantee was "to have and to hold the
premises for and after the death of" the grantor. It also contained the
statement that "it is the intention of the grantor by this deed to convey said property to said [grantee] for life to take effect on the death
of the grantor." It is very clear that the grantor intended to be bound
by the deed as and from the time of its execution for it was duly acknowledged and recorded. But the court felt "required by the authorities to hold the deed void because it is testamentary in character
and not executed according to the statutes of wills." It seems impossible to defend this decision but the reversal and remanding of
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In O'Day v. Meadows,103 the court relied on the statute

as to future freeholds in upholding a springing interest created
by deed, and it seems that apart from the statute it would have
declared it void. Christ v. Kuehne was not cited. It has been
pointed out-in this study that the result of O'Day v. Meadows
need not be rested on the statute, and if the foregoing analysis
of Christ v. Kuehne be sound, that case ought to have been controlling authority.
Since the decision in O'Day v. Meadows there would seem
to be no doubt as to the validity of a springing interest created
by deed both under and independently of the statute, and it is
to be hoped that the court will not continue to repeat the obsolete
10 4
maxim that a freehold cannot be limited in futuro.

But it were still somewhat of a venture to say that shifting
interests can be created by deed in Missouri for we may yet be
confronted with a decision that a fee limited upon a fee is void,
in spite of the statute as to freeholds in futuro, tho by a conveythe case may be put upon the ground of incompetency of one of the
witnesses. Wimpey v. Ledford (1915) 177 S. W. 302 was decided by
the other division of the court five months after the opinion in Goodale
v. Evans was handed down. The instrument professed to be made
with the understanding that the grantor should have the property
during his lifetime and that at his death "then the title is to pass"
to the grantee. This would seem to be a more emphatic postponement
of the time of the instrument's binding the grantor than the words in
Goodale v. Evans, but the court held it to be a good deed without citing
Goodale v. Evans and chiefly, it seems, on the authority of Dozier v.
Toalson and Christ v. Kuchne. Wimpey v. Ledford offers a ray of
hope for the narrowing of Murphy v. Gabbert and Goodale v. Evans.
It is submitted that If possible every instrument ought to be so construed as to be capable of having some effect, Hunt v. Hunt (1904) 119

Ky. 39, and that in view of this principle there can be no possible justification of the strict rule of Goodale v. Evans and its defeat of clearly

expressed intentions.

103. (1905) 194 Mo. 588. In Anglade v. St. Avit (1878) 67 Mo.
434, it was said that an ante-nuptial contract operated as a conveyance
as of the time of the marriage, but the contract seema to have been
made on the same day on which the marriage was celebrated so that
the case is no authority for a conveyance in futuro.
104. The court in Aldridge v. Aldridge (1906) 202 Mo. 565, said of
creating a future freehold, "if that be conceded." It is submitted that it
ought to have been conceded without argument.
(1913) 252 Mo. 58.

See Sims v. Brown
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ance which may operate as a bargain and sale. 10 5 The history
of the subject in other states, notably in Illinois,106 is not encouraging.
B.

Of Chattels Real and Personal

6. Under the Common Law. It is a more difficult task to
trace the origin and history of future interests in personal property. The feudal restrictions resulting from the rules concerning
seisin did not apply to chattels, for from a very early time chattels
have been owned absolutely and not held. Strictly, it is improper
to speak of estates in, chattels, therefore, and there would seem
to be no reason why future interests in chattels should not be
freely created and transferred.' 0 7 Certain distinctions have
grown up which make necessary the separate treatment of chattels real and chattels personal.
Chattels Real. A lease for ninety-nine years puts into the
lessee an estate of less than freehold which is conveniently called
a term and classed as a chattel real. A term could be assigned
very informally at common law and smaller terms could be created
out of it by sub-leases; but no life estate could be carved out of it
for the very technical if not absurd reason that in the eyes of
the law a life estate is greater than any term.lUs A future term
105. In Pendleton v. Bell (1'862) 32 Mo. 100, by a marriage settle-

ment, executed before the marriage, land was conveyed to trustees to
the use of the husband and his heirs until the marriage and then to the
us of the wife for life, etc. No question was raised as to the validity of
the shifting interest.
106. The Illinois Supreme Court held a shifting executory interest
created by deed void, in Palmer v. Cook (1896) 159 Ill. 300; and a
similar result was reached as to executory devises in Ewing v. Barnes
(1895) 156 Ill. 61, and Silva v. Hopkinson (1895) 158 Ill. 386. But the
latter two cases seem to have been overruled in Glover v. Condell (1896)
163 Ill. 566. See the discussion of these cases by Prof. Louis M. Greeley
in 14 Harvard Law Review 595, which is answered in Kales, Future
Interests in Illinois, § 163 et seq. Palmer v. Cook seems to have been
recently overruled in Stoller v. Doyle (1913) 257 I1. 369, which recognizes the possibility of limiting a fee on a fee by deed. See 8 Illinois
Law Review 495.
107. 4 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 39; Gray, Perpetuities (3d
ed.) § 802 et seq.
108. Thus any estate for years will merge In a life estate.
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could be created109 and an existing term could be assigned in
futuro, there being no danger of putting the seisin in abeyance and
no necessity of livery of seisin. But the termor could not assign
to another from and after the death of the assignor, for this
would be in effect carving a. life estate out of the term and such
an attempted assignment is void. 110 A having a term may assign it to C from and after B's death, however, for there is no
presumption that B will not die during the term. But if A assigns to B for life and then to C the whole term will pass to B
at common law and C will take nothing.
The statute of uses did not change these rules for it applied
only when one person is seised to another's use. Estates for
years could be created under the statute by an agreement by one
having a freehold to stand seised to another's use,"' but once
created, the term could not be transferred by any method of
conveyance operating under the statute. In England today, therefore, it is common to create a trust when future interests in
terms are settled. 112 Nor did the statute of wills have any
effect on bequests of chattels real. It was settled in Manning's
Case' 13 that executory bequests of chattels are good, and since
that time a bequest of a term to A, for life and then to B will
carry the whole term to A, subject to B's executory interest. It
has been held, however, that if a chattel real is bequeathed to
A for life the executor has a reversionary interest after A's
death,' 1 4 tho it were difficult to defend this result if B's interest was executory in the other case.
109. Before entry, the lessee would have but an interesse termini
which is assignable. Whether c. term created to begin in futuro can be
remote and therefore void on account of the rule against perpetuities,
see 29 Law Quarterly Review 303, 30 Law Quarterly Review 66.
110.

Welcdon v. Elkington (1578)

Plowden 519, 520;

Gray, Per-

petuities (3d ed.) § 809 et seq.
111. It was for this reason that conveyances by lease and release
were invented. To avoid entry and the statute of enrolments, A, desiring to convey to B, leased to B for a year and then released to him.
The lease operated by way of bargain and sale, the release operated at

common law, really as a grant.
112. Goodeve, Personal Property (5th ed.) p. 7.

113. (1609) 8 Co. 94b. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d. ed.) § 813.
114. Eyres v. Faulklang (1697) 1 Salk. 231. The executor's interest was called a possibility of reverter. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d.
ed.) I 820.
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Chattels Personal. The common law permitted the transfer
of a chattel personal in futuro, tho it had to be by deed. Tho a
bailment for years was always enforceable, the creation of successive future interests was not allowed. It was said that a "gift
or devise of a chattel for an hour is forever." 115 But the doctrine of Manning's Case was extended to chattels personal and
executory interests were allowed to be created by will or by transfer to trustees.1 16 As early as the seventeenth century it was
possible to bequeath chattels personal to A for life and then to
B, for B was conceived to have the legal interest and A but the use
and occupation. 117 Current opinion in England seems to regard
all future interests in chattels as susceptible of creation only in
equity, or perhaps by executory bequest. It may be doubted
whether any future limitation of chattels real or personal can
be made in England by a transfer inter vivos without resorting
to equity.1 18 Neither the statute of uses nor the statute of wills
had any application to chattels personal." 9
7. The Missouri Statutes. The common law adopted in
1816 would seem to have been as it is now in England. But in
the United States generally remainders in chattels personal are
well recognized, 20 and executory interests are created without
much distinction between deeds and wills.' 2 1

The Missouri stat-

115. Bro. Ab. Devise, 13. Professor Ames ascribed the doctrine of
the text to procedural history. See 3 Harvard Law Review 313. But

Professor Gray thought it due to the late invention of the conception of
executory interests. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d. ed.) § 824.
116. See Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 405; Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 829.
117. Hide v. Parratt (1696) 2 Vern. 331. The distinction between
the gift of the use of a thing and a gift of the thing itself has now been
exploded in England. Williams, Personal Property (16th ed.) p. 359.

118. The English writers still say that there can be no remainder
in a chattel real or personal. See Goodeve, Personal Property (5th
ed.) p. 8; Williams, Personal Property (16th ed.) p. 45; 2 Jarman, Wills
(6th ed.) p. 1453. Consumable goods, quae ipso usu consumuntur, are
not susceptible of successive limitations and any gift of them must be
absolute. Randall v. Russell (1817) 3 Mer. 190.
119. "Future interests in personalty owe nothing to statutes; they
are what they are by the common law." Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.)
§ 845.
120. State ex rel Farley v. Welsh (1913) 175 Mo. App. 303. The difference between the English and American law is probably due to Blackstone's influence on the latter. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 398.
121. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 844.
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utes have not converted terms for years into real property, tho
the chapter on conveyances' 22 provides that the term "real
estate" as used therein "shall be construed as coextensive in
meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments, and as embracing all chattels real.'

12 3

The statute authorizing the cre-

ation of estates of freehold or inheritance in futuro by deed as
by will does not apply to personal property, for no estate of freehold or inheritance can be created in personal property. 124 The
common law as to the creation of executory interests in chattels real and personal has not been changed by any Missouri
statute.
8. The Missouri Decisions. Tho outside of the recent decision in State ex rel. Farley v. Welsh 25 the possibility of a re-

mainder after a life interest in a chattel has received little attention from the Missouri courts, it may be taken to be a settled thing in Missouri law. A gift of a chattel real or personal
by deed or will to A for life and then to B, will confer a legal interest in remainder on B unless the goods are such that their
use will mean their consumption, 126 tho in English law B would
be said to have but an executory interest. A transfer of a chattel to A absolutely, but on an event to B will raise the question
here to be considered.
Chattels real. The writer has found but one Missouri case
involving the creation of an executory interest in a chattel real,
viz., Straat v. Uhrig,127 and in later comments on this case the
fact that it involved the gift of a chattel real has not been noticed. 128 By deed, A transferred a term for ten years to B in
122. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2822.
123. Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co. (1909) 225
Mo. 414.
124. In Blair v. Oliphant (1845) 9 Mo, 239, the court said that "the

statute which makes terms for years dowable must be understood as
placing them in all respects upon a footing with descendible freeholds."
But this was unnecessary to the decision, and it has been disapproved

in Orchardv. Wright-Dalton-Bell-AnchorStore Co. (1909) 225 Mo. 414.
125. (1913) 175 Mo. App. 303. See also Riggins v. McClellan (1859)
28 Mo. 23; Lewey v. Lewey (1864) 34 Mo. 367.
126. See Gregory v. Cowgill (1854) 19 Mo. 415; Allen v. Claybrook
(1874) 58 Mo. 124, 131.
127. (1874) 56 Mo. 482.
128. In Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo. 490, 501; Cornwell v.
Wulff (1898) 148 Mo. 542, 565, 577.
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trust for C, a feme covert, for her sole and separate use, and
B covenanted and agreed to permit C to convey as directed
by C by will or otherwise in writing and in default of any appointment by C to convey after her death to the children of C
and D. It was said that this deed created an absolute trust estate in C "with a springing contingent trust in favor of her children," and the court held that after C's death without having
made an, appointment, B was entitled to receive the rents in
trust for the children. 12 9 The court said that the deed was "in
the ordinary form of a deed of bargain and sale under the statute
of uses," but this does not mean that it operated under the statute of uses for there being no seisin in A, the statute did not
apply. The deed operated as an assignment to the trustee who
took the whole legal estate, and even in England the equitable interest of the children would have been enforced. 130 The
case is therefore no authority for the creation of an executory
interest in a term by deed, without the interposition of trustees,
and it cannot yet be said whether the Missouri courts will follow the English rule forbidding such interests to be created by
deed. The meager authorities in other states do not admit of
the hazard of a guess. 131
There should be no doubt as to the validity of an executory bequest of a term for years in Missouri, for there can be
1 2
no sound reason for a refusal to follow Manning's Case.
129. It was erroneously said in Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo.
490, 501, that Straat v. Uhrig "held the remainder valid." This error
had been made in a dissenting opinion by MARSHALL, J., In Cornwell
v. Wulff (1898) 148 Mo. 543, 577. The criticism of Straat v. Uhrig in
the majority opinion in the latter case, p. 565, was made without any
reference to the fact that it involved a chattel real.
130. The effect of the added power of disposition on the limitation
over might have made it bad, however. Vide post, p. 40.
131. In Maryland, an executory interest in a term may be created
either by deed or will. Culbreth v. Smith (1888) 69 Md. 450. See
Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) p. 816.
132. In Halbert v. Halbert (1855) 21 Mo. 277, the court referred
to a quotation concerning Manning's Case with apparent approval of its
doctrine. The doctrine of Manning's Case was approved in Waldo v.
Cummings (1867) 45 Ill. 421, 427 and in Welsh v. Belleville Savings
Bank (1879) 94 Ill. 191, 204. See Kales, Future Interests in Illinois,
§ 186.
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Chattels personal. There are several early cases which involved future interests in slaves. In Wilson v. Cockrell,133 a
gift of certain slaves was made by deed in consideration of
love and affection to Juliet, her executors, administrators and
assigns, and of certain other slaves to William in like manner,
with a proviso that if either Juliet or William should "die without heirs, then the property of the one so dying shall absolutely
vest in the other."' 134 After the death of Juliet without issue,
William brought replevin for a female slave against a purchaser
from Juliet. The gift over to William was held void, apparently
on the ground that no executory limitation of a chattel could be
made by deed, and the court seems to have thought future interests in chattels created by deed to be subject to the same restrictions as future interests in land created by common law
The Kentucky court's decision in Betty v.
conveyances.
Moore135 was relied on, but it can be rested on a Kentucky statute. The authority of Wilson v. Cockrell is very much weakened by the fact that the gift over was clearly bad for remoteness, tho this fact escaped the court's attention. 136 In Vaughn
v. Guy,"37 the court said that "there can be no doubt of the correctness of the principle asserted in Wilson v. Cockrell," and in
Halbert v. Halbert138 the doctrine of Wilson v. Cockrell was
again asserted tho it was not essential to the disposition made.
133. (1843) 8 Mo. 1. Judge Napton was absent when the case was
argued and probably did not participate in the decision, which may
therefore represent the opinion of but two judges.

134. The words quoted are from the language of the court, and
were probably not the verbatim terms of the deed. The words "die
without heirs" were probably used for "die without heirs of the body."
Even so, the gift over was remote. See 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin,
p. 7.
135. (1833) 1 Dana 235. See 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin,
p. 8, note 42.
136. See 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, pp. 8-9, note 48; Gray,
Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 91, note.
137. (1853) 17 Mo. 429. The court said In Vaughn v. Guy that the
statute making failures of issue definite, Revised Statutes 1845, c. 32,
§ 6, had abolished "the distinction between the construction of limitations created by deed, and those whose existence depends on wills
and conveyances under the statute of uses." This must refer only
to the distinction drawn In Forth v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wins. 663.
See 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 9, note 48.
138. (1855) 21 Mo. 277. See the comment on Halbert v. Halbert
In 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 9.
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The bequest over in Chism v. Williams1" 9 would apparently
have been upheld but for its being on an indefinite failure of
issue and therefore remote, and the court refused to consider
the previous decisions in which the gift was by deed. The decision in State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson 14° is very surprising after
Chism v. Williams. A testator gave certain real and personal
property to A with a limitation over to B in the event of A's
death without issue. The action against the administrator de
bonis non cure testamento anne o concerned the money so given.
The gift over was held to be on a definite failure of issue and
not remote,1 41 but as A took the entire property and not a mere
life estate the limitation over was held to be "void for repugnancy."' 142 But such repugnancy characterizes every shift139. (1860) 29 Mo. 288.
140. (1880) 73 Mo. 320.
141. See 3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 11.
142. Three cases were cited by the court:
Rubey v. Barnett
(1848) 12 Mo. 6, Allen v. Claybrook (1874) 58 Mo. 124, 131, Amelia
Smith's Appeal (1854) 23 Pa. St. 9. None of these sustains the result reached. In Rubey v. Barnett, a life estate was given. In Allen
v. Claybrook, at p. 131, the reference is to a general gift with a power of
disposition; there was no power of disposition in State ex rel Haines
v. Tolson. The decision in Amelia Smith's Appeal was on the ground
that words which create an estate tail in land create an absolute interest in chattels, but the words in question created an estate in the land
also devised only by implication, and the implication would seem
to have been improper. There were similar words in State ex rel.
Haines v. Tolson. The validity of the gift over of the personalty was
not really involved in Amelia Smith's Appeal, for the court of probate
was declaring only the distribution at the death of the testator.
An executory bequest after a bequest to A and the heirs of his body
should be held good, unless it is remote. Such a gift of a leasehold
was upheld in Lamb v. Archer (1673) 1 Salk, 224. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 357, note. But if the contrary were conceded, as
seems to have been Jarman's opinion, 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) p. 1202,
yet words which would give a fee tail in realty only by implication ought
not to be construed to create an interest in personalty so absolute as to
invalidate any executory bequest. Even if Amelia Smith's Appeal be
sustained on this point, it should be noticed that it depended upon an
indefinite failure of issue, for the Pennsylvania statute making failures of issue definite was not enacted until 1897. See Foulke, Perpetuities In Pennsylvania, p. 196, note. The gift over was therefore void
for remoteness, unless the rule of Forth v. Chapman (1720) 1 P. Wins.
663, could save it. Whereas in State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson it was
distinctly held that the gift over was on a definite failure of issue, if
indeed the statute did not impel this result. A gift over of a chattel on
a definite failure of issue is good. Stone v. Maule (1829) 2 Sim. 490;
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ing interest, 143 and if this were a sufficient reason no executory
shifting interest ought to be creatable by deed or will-and there
can be no reason why real and personal property should be
treated differently in this respect. Yet the court had previously
purported to uphold an executory devise of lands in Faust v.
Birner.144 As a decision that a shifting executory bequest of
a chattel personal is void, State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson is opposed to a long and unbroken line of authorities in other jurisdictions. 14 5 Later comments have failed to point out its pe146
culiarity.
There seems to have been no later decision in which an executory interest was created in a chattel, except In cases where
the first taker was expressly given a power of disposition and
these cases will be considered separately. As the law stands
therefore, an executory interest to take effect on the death of
the first taker without issue cannot be created in a chattel personal by deed, for Wilson v. Cockrell has not been overruled
tho it can be distinguished on the ground of the remoteness of
the gift; nor by will, if the gift is on, the event that the first
taker who is given an absolute interest should die without issue living at his death, tho State ex rel. Haincs v. Tolson may
be limited to its very facts when occasion arises. If a picture
were given to A and his executors, with a proviso that if a certain painter, X, should come to Columbia to live it should
belong to X, the gift ought to be upheld if made in a will in
spite of State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson, and it is submitted that
Smith, Executory Interest, § 600. This is recognized in In re Moorhead's Estate (1897) 180 Pa. 119, by the same court which decided
Amelia Smith's Appeal.
143. For a discussion of various uses of the term "repugnancy,"
see Kales, Future Interests, §§ 141, 173.
144. (1860) 30 Mo. 414, Infra, p. 14. See also Harbison v. Swan
(1878) 58 Mo. 147.
145. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 848, note 5. A statement
in Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 1781, supports the Missouri
court's decision. Merrill v. Emery (1830) 10 Pick. 507, is there cited,
but that case may be explained on other grounds. See also Theobald,
Wills (5th ed.) p. 565.
146. State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson seems to have been approved
in Munro v. Collins (1888) 95 Mo. 33. It was justified in Cornwell v.
Orton (1894) 126 Mo. 355, 369, on the ground that "it was an attempt to limit a remainder on a fee," which of course was a mistake.
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this would not involve overruling that case; it should also be
upheld if made in a deed, tho the English law seems contra, for
Wilson v. Cockrell is likewise to be limited to its facts. But the
careful lawyer will not take the risk, and the gift to X should
be accomplished by means of a trust which would make it good
beyond question.
There may be some doubt as to the validity of an executory
bequest of a chattel real, also, since an executory bequest of a
chattel personal may be void.
III

EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS FOLLOWING POWERS OF DISPOSAL

Assuming that an, executory limitation ot realty or personalty is good whether it is contained in a deed or a will, a
special class of cases must be considered in which the first taker
is given a power of absolute disposal and the limitation over is
to take effect in the event of his failure to exercise it. In such
cases it will make no difference whether the limitation is in a
deed or a will. If a demise or a devise is made to A and his
heirs, with a proviso that if A goes into the army then the land
is to go to B and his heirs, we shall assume that the limitation
to B is good; indeed, there would have been no doubt of it except for the Missouri decisions previously reviewed. If the proviso be that if A dies without having gone into the army then
the land is to go to B and his heirs, B would have a valid executory interest. Yet in both cases A by doing or refraining from
doing some act might defeat the executory limitation to B. If
the land were limited to A and his heirs subject to a power given
to B to appoint by deed or will to his children and with a proviso that in default of appointment by B the land should go to
C and his heirs, there can be no doubt of the validity of the
14 7
limitation to C. But if the limitation is to A and his heirs
with full power to convey or devise the absolute fee simple, and
with a proviso that if he does not exercise the power the land
147. The common law requirement of the use of the word "heirs"
in creating a fee simple was abrogated in Missouri as to devises in
1825, Revised Statutes 1825, p. 795, § 19; and as to deeds in 1835, Re-

vised Statutes 1835, p. 119, § 2.
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shall go to B and his heirs, then the limitation to B is said to
be void. 148 If the gift is to A for life with full power to convey or devise the fee and with a proviso that if he does not convey or devise it the land shall go to B and his heirs, then the
limitation to B is good. 149 Just why this difference? The
cases will be reviewed to determine the reason for such a rule
and the effect which it has had on the construction of instruments.
The Missouri cases refer the origin of this rule in Missouri to the harmless statement made obiter in Rubey v. Barnett'50 that an unlimited gift to one who is given d general power
of disposal carries the fee; it is not at all clear that the court
had in mind the question of the validity of a limitation over, for
it was addressing itself to the question of whether a devisee
took for life or in fee and it held that only a life estate had
been given. 151 In Gregory v. Cowgill,r" 2 it was clearly held that
one to whom real and personal property was given for life did
not take a greater interest by reason of a gift over of what
might remain at his death. 153 In Jecko v. Taussig, 5 4 a deed
conferred on the first taker a power to convey the fee" and the
estate was not expressly limited to a life estate; the only question before the court was as to the power of the first taker to
convey an "absolute fee," but it seems to have been of the opin148. It should be noted that A may convey the fee subject to
the limitation over without any special power being given to him;
and if the added power does not give him power to convey the fee free
from the gift over, the rule here being considered does not apply.
149. The limits of this study do not admit of a determination of
the sufficiency of various expressions for conferring powers of disposal on life tenants. On this subject see a valuable article by Professor Kales in 7 Illinois Law Review 504.
150. (1848) 12 Mo. 3. While the court cited Jackson v. Robins
(1819) 16 Johns. 587, there was apparently no appreciation of the
actual decision in that case.
151. See also Norcum v. D'Oench (1852) 17 Mo. 98, where a life
tenant had a power which was exercised.
152. (1854) 19 Mo. 415. Some of the personalty was perishable
and such that use would consume it. The court seems to have thought
that no power of disposition was conferred on the life taker, the expression as to remaining property being construed to carry an absolute interest in the perishable personalty. Cf. Reinders v. Koppelman
(1878) 68 Mo. 482, 492.
153. Cf. Foote v. Sanders (1880) 72 Mo. 616.
154. (1869) 45 Mo. 167.
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ion that the gift over on non-exercise of the power was good
-it was said to be "contingent on the non-exercise of the power."
It is submitted that this is a distinct recognition of a contingent
executory limitation by deed, tho it was obiter.155
In Green v. Sutton,1 56 there was a bargain and sale to A
and his heirs to the use of B and such uses as B might appoint
and in the event of B's dying intestate to the heirs of C. B died
intestate before C died. The court seems to have held that B
did not take for life only, and that the limitation over was therefore void as a remainder. It is difficult to ascertain just the
ground of the decision for the court spoke of a "power of absolute disposal, which can only be had by the holder of the fee"
and admitted in the next paragraph that a life tenant could be
given a power of disposal; it also said that "this was not intended
to be a limitation over," from which we may infer that the court
157
did not intend to hold that an executory limitation was void.
As a contingent remainder following a life estate, the future
interest failed because of the impossibility of ascertaining the
persons to take when the particular estate ended. Grcen v. Sutton is of dubious authority because of the uncertain reasoning of
the court. 15 8
155. The actual decision In Jecko v. Taussig would have been
the same if the first taker had but a life estate; but in that event the
gift over should have been called a vested remainder which could have
been divested by an exercise of the power. See also, Hazel v. Hagan
(1871) 47 Mo. 277. The court seems to have admitted that such a remainder was contingent on the non-exercise of the power, in Grace v.
Perry (1906) 197 Mo. 550.
156. (1872) 50 Mo. 186.
157. Jackson v. Robins (1819) 16 Johns. 288 and Pulliam v. Byrd
(1847) 2 Strob. Eq. 134, were cited by the court. The gift in the latter
case was very clearly for the life of the first taker and there was
no gift over in the event of the non-exercise of the power; so that
the decision is authority for the proposition only that the life tenant
did not take the fee as a consequence of the power of disposal. Pulliam v. Byrd is therefore no authority for Green v. Sutton. Jackson v.
Robins will be considered post in the connection with the origin of this
rule.
158. Judge Bliss wrote the principal opinion, In which Judge
Wagner concurred. Judge Adams concurred in result, briefly stating
that the limitation over failed because of the non-ascertainment of
the persons to take when the first taker died, tho he apparently failed
to perceive that this was only necessary if the future estate was a remainder.
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Straat v. Uhrig919 is a clear decision upholding the limitation
over in spite of the first taker's power of disposal. A leasehold was
assigned by deed to a trustee for A, who was given full power
to dispose of it, and in the event of no disposal the trustee was
to convey to the children of A and B when they reached twentyone. The court's opinion, concurred in by four very able judges,
was that A took an absolute trust estate with a valid shifting
(erroneously called springing) limitation to the children. The
decision was not achieved blindly, for the counsel had contended
for an application of the rule which would have made the limitation over void.' 60
The next case' 61 of a limitation over following a fee with
absolute power of disposal was Tremmel v. Kleibolt.0 2 A conveyed certain lands to B in trust for C, A's wife, and the trustee
covenanted to convey as directed by C by deed or will, and in
default of C's exercise of the power to convey to C's heirs; the
trustee conveyed to C's heir after C's death, and the heir brought
ejectment against A, her father, who held possession as tenant by
curtesy. In giving judgment for the defendant the court stressed
the fact that A had not intended to deprive himself of curtesy,
but it seems to have said also that C took the whole estate fol159. (1874) 56 Mo. 482.
160. Rubey v. Barnett and Jackson v. Robins were both cited in
the argument. Nor Is the decision weakened by the fact that the
gift over was to A's children who would have benefitted, even if A
had been given the absolute interest; for tle issue was between the
trustee and A's administrator, and the decision had the same effect
as tho the gift over had been to persons unrelated to A. Straat v. Uhrig was severely criticized by Gantt, C. J., in Cornwell v. Wulff (1898)
148 Mo. 542, 565.
161. In Carr v. Dings (1873) 54 Mo. 95, (1874) 58 Mo. 400, the
first devisee had but a life estate by force of the fact that the property
was "to be used and appropriated in and about her maintenance and
support." In Bryant v. Christian (1874) 58 Mo. 98, the devise was
expressly for life. In Allen v. Claybrook (1874) 58 Mo. 124, no power
of disposal was given to the first taker. So, too, in Pollard v. Union
National Bank (1877) 4 Mo. App. 408. In Reinders v. Koppelman
(1878) 68 Mo. 482, It was held that the life estate was not enlarged into
a fee by the addition of a power of disposal. In Foote v. Sanders (1880)
72 Mo. 616, both realty and personalty were given to A for life, and
"what then remains" was given over; the court held that A took
no power of disposal of the realty, since the quoted words could refer to the personalty. In Boyer v. Allen (1882) 76 Mo. 498, the power
to convey was clearly exercised.
162. (1881) 75 Mo. 255. Also reported in (1879) 6 Mo. App. 549.
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lowing Green v. Sutton163 and that the gift over was void as a
renainder. All of this was unnecessary, however, for even if
the gift over was good as an executory limitation A would have
been entitled to curtesy, 1 4 and if this were not true the case is
weakened by the fact that the heirs of C would have taken anyway by descent from C.
The facts of Wead v. Gray0 5 are more complicated. A,
the maker of several notes, gave deeds of trust to secure them
and died leaving a will in which his property was given to C.
Notes secured by a second deed of trust were bequeathed by
B to C who was given full power of disposal during her lifetime
with a gift over to D in the event of her failure to exercise it.
C devised her property to D, who sought to have the deed of
trust given by A cancelled on the ground that when the notes
came into C's hands the deed of trust could no longer be alive because of her holding the equity of redemption. B's administrator resisted the cancellation and was sustained by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals which held that the gift over to D was good as
an executory devise, that C could not exercise the power by will,
and that there was no "merger." The Supreme Court, however, decreed the cancellation and expressed the opinion that
the gift over to D was bad as "an abortive effort to give to one
the absolute property, and at the same time to engraft a remainder upon it," relying mainly on State ex rel. Haines v. Tolson, in

which, as has been pointed out, there was no added power of disposal. No reason is assigned for this invalidity except that the
gift over was "inconsistent," and yet the court itself admitted the
possibility of executory limitations when not preceded by powers
of disposal. The Supreme Court also expressed the opinion that
C's power of disposal included the power to bequeath the notes.
On this theory, the gift over to D was of course defeated by the
163. The court also relied on Gushing v. Blake (1879) 30 N. J.
689, but that case rested on the rule in Shelley's Case and was
therefore of no authority in Missouri.
164. Buckworth v. Thirkell (1785) 1 Coll. Juris. 322. See also
Tiffany, Real Property, § 183. Tremmel v. Kleiboldt was misconceived
by MARSHALL, J., In Cornwell v. Wulff (1898) 148 Mo. 542, 577.
Eq.

165.

(1880) 8 Mo. App. 515, (1883)

78 Mo. 59.
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bequest, and it was unnecessary for the court to express any
opinion as to its validity.' 66 The decision may be distinguished
on this important ground, therefore.
Harbison v. James'0 7 presented a question of conflict of
laws which did not receive the attention which it merited and
which has been neglected in subsequent comment. A testator
domiciled in Kentucky died there leaving property in Kentucky
which he devised to his wife with power to sell and re-invest, and
"at her death any portion remaining undisposed of" was given
to his daughters. The wife invested some of the proceeds in
Missouri. Plainly any rights in this Missouri property depended
on the effect of the will, which was determined solely by Kentucky
law. The Kentucky court had passed on the same will in Anderson v. Hall,165 and the Missouri court referred to the decision with approval but seems to have thought it was applying the
Missouri rule in determining that the wife took but a life estate
with a valid remainder to the daughters. It is submitted that
Anderson v. Hall was controlling, and the decision of Harbison
v. James is, therefore, of little importance in Missouri in spite
of the frequency with which it has been cited. The actual decision did not involve the validity of the limitation over. 10 9
Gaven v. Allen17 ° presents a peculiar situation. A testator
devised land to his wife, with a gift over in the event of her
166. See the comment in Munro v. Collins (1888) 95 Mo. 33, 38.
It may also be noted that the gift of the notes to C, who held the equity

of redemption in the land, may have been held to have cancelled the
security for the notes even tho the gift over were good and not defeated.
167. (1866) 90 Mo. 411. In Russell v. Eubanks (1884) 84 Mo. 82,
the first devisee took for life only. In Bean v. Kenmuir (1885) 86 Mo.
666, there was no added power to convey tho the first taker was to hold
to herself and "her heirs and assigns" forever. The power given
to the first taker in Hardy v. Clarkson (1885) 87 Mo. 171, was exercised and what was said about the gift over was therefore obiter.
168. (1882) 80 Ky. 91. C. Snively v. Snively (Ky., 1915) 172 S.
W. 911.
169. In Munro v. Collins (1888) 95 Mo. 33, the litigation conperned personal property which was bequeathed to the testator's widow
"to be held and enjoyed by her as her own" and "after death, such of
said property as shall then be in her possession" was given to the testator's daughter. The court held that the wife had only a life interest without a power of disposal, and said that the later quoted words
had reference to the consumable personalty. See also Cook v. Couch
(1889) 100 Mo. 29.
170. (1889) 100 Mo. 293.
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re-marriage, and gave her a power of sale; the widow sought
specific performance by one who agreed to buy the land and who
contended that she could not convey a "perfect title in fee." It
was held that the wife had only a "qualified fee," but that she
could convey a perfect title in fee. While the result would have
been the same if the gift over had been held to be void, the court
very clearly thought it was good. It should be noted that the
event on which the limitation over was made, was in no way connected with the exercise of the power.
The question of the validity of an executory limitation after
a full power of disposal was squarely presented in Cornwell v.
Orton.171 Land was conveyed by deed to A and his heirs in
trust for B, who was to have full power to convey or devise, and
in the event of a failure to exercise the power the trustee was to
convey to C and his heirs. The court 172 held that B's interest
was not limited to a life estate and that the limitation to C was
void. No reason was assigned for the latter, except that a remainder cannot be limited after a fee. The limitation over was
said to be repugnant, for which the court relied upon Green
v. Sutton and Tremmel v. Kleiboldt and repeated the dictum of
Rubey v. Barnett that "a power to dispose of a thing as one
pleases, must necessarily carry along with it a full property in
it." The decision was reviewed by the court en banc in Cornwell
v.

Vulffl 7 3 a few years later, and for the first time the court

was forced into an analysis of the principle and its foundation,
and while it admitted the possibility of an executory limitation
in a deed, it refused to change its ruling that an executory limitation after an absolute power of disposition in the first taker
is void. No reasons were given for such a proposition but the
171. (1894) 126 Mo. 355. In Lewis v. Pitman (1890) 101 Mo. 281
and in Redman v. Barger (1893) 118 Mo. 668, the first taker was held
to have a life estate, tho this construction was in both cases influenced by the acceptance of the notion that the gift over would have
been void if the first taker had taken a fee. See also Greffet v. Willman (1892) 114 Mo. 106; Schorr v. Carter (1893) 120 Mo. 409; Evans v.
Folks (1896) 135. Mo. 397.
172. Division number two, composed of GANTT, BURGEss, and
SHERWOOD, JJ.

173.

(1898) 148 Mo. 542.
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court relied upon Ide v. Ide174 and Jackson v. Bull 175 and Chancellor Kent's statement. 176 Green v. Sutton was also relied on, and
Straat v. Uhrig was emphatically disapproved. Curiously enough,
the dissenting judges1 77 did not deny that the limitation over was
void if the first taker took a fee, but they relied on, Lewis v. Pitman' 7 8 in asserting that the first taker took only a life estate.
All of the judges agreed that the limitation after a power of disposal was void, if the first taker got a fee; yet no reasons were
given beyond the citations, and Green v. Sutton was not clear
enough to have produced such unanimity.
In later decisions the issue has usually been whether a life
estate or a fee was given to the first taker and it has uniformly
been admitted that if a fee has been given the gift over is void.
Since the clear statement of this principle in Cornwell v. Wulff,
the court has shown a disposition to follow Lewis v. Pittman and
hold that a life estate has been conferred on the first taker even
in the absence of express words, in order to avoid the invalidity
of the gift over. 179 In Walton v. Drumtra,1 s0 the deed was in
all respects like that in Cornwell v. Wulff but it was held that
the gift over was valid because the first taker took but a life estate, tho the court lapsed into confusion and spoke of the gift
over as taking effect as an executory limitation. An attempt was
made' 8 ' to distinguish Cornwell v. Wulff on the ground that the
174. (1809) 5 Mass. 500.
175. (1813) 10 Johns. 19.
176. 4 Kent, Commentaries, 270. In thus referring to the origin
of this rule, the court ought to have referred to Professor Gray's classic
criticism of the cases cited, which had then been published several
years; a reference to it might have changed the decision.
177. SmERWOOD, BRACE and MARSHALL, JJ. Judge SlIERWOOD had
changed his mind after the decision in Cornwell v. Orton.
178. (1890) 101 Mo. 281.
179. See McMillan v. Farrow (1897) 141 Mo. 55, in which the
gift over was of what remained at the death of the first taker; and Cross
v. Hoch (1899) 149 Mo. 325.
180.
(1899) 152 Mo. 189. The decision follows an earlier construction of the same deed by the federal court in Yore v. Yore (1874)
63 Fed. 645; but the federal court apparently did not consider the
possibility of the gift over taking effect as an executory limitation.
181. See the opinion of Buorwss, J., on p. 503, and the opinion of
GANTT, C. J., on p. 511. The latter judge also attempted to distinguish
Cornwell v. Wulff as a case of an executed trust, but this seems immaterial unless the active trustee be clothed with discretion to de-
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deed in that case contained no gift over, but this was a patent
misstatement of the facts. A majority of the court admitted that
Cornwell v. Wulff had been improperly decided on the ground
that the deed ought to have been held to have given the first
taker only a life estate, and Walton v. Druintra must be taken
to have overruled Cornwell v. Wulff for a majority of the court
saw no distinction between the two cases.
Roth v. Rauschenbusch'82 was decided by two of the judges
who had stood up for Cornwell v. Wulff. The limitation over
had been defeated by a conveyance by the first taker, and the
devisees of the gift over sought to avoid the conveyance on the
ground that it was the result of undue influence practiced upon
the first taker; but the court held that they had no standing in
court for the limitation over was void as an executory devise because "such a limitation is inconsistent with the absolute estate
and power of disposition expressly given or necessarily implied
from the will." ' 183

The same judges also decided Jackson v.

termine the shares of the beneficiaries, and the court did not subscribe to it. RoBiNSON, J., who concurred in the majority opinion in

Cornwell v. Wulff, had changed his mind since the decision of that
case and expressed the opinion that it was wrongly decided. This puts
Gornwell v. Wulff in the position of having been decided by three
out of seven judges, and disapproved in Walton v. Drumtra by four
out of seven.
182. (1903) 173 Mo. 582. The decision was by two judges of division number two; Fox, J., did not sit. The decision represents the
opinion of GANTT and BURGESS, JJ. Roy, C., speaking of Roth v. Rauschenbusch in Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo. 490, said that the division which decided it "assumed the responsibility of overruling in
effect, the decision of the full court in Walton v. Drumtra." But it is
submitted that he failed to note that the problem before the court
in each case was one of construction, and that the terms of the will
in the later case were not exactly the same as those of the deed in
the earlier case.
183. In Gannon v. Albright (1904) 183 Mo. 238, the event on which
the limitation over was made did not occur, the the court was clearly
of opinion that the limitation over was void; and later in Gannon v.
Pauk (1906) 200 Mo. 75, it was held that the power had been exercised
by the first taker. In Papin v. Peidnoir (1907) 205 Mo. 521, the first
taker was held to have properly exercised the power. See also Grace
v. Perry (1906) 197 Mo. 550; Armor v. Frey (1909) 226 Mo. 646; Threlkeld v. Threlkeld (1911) 238 Mo. 459. In Young v. Robinson (1906)
122 Mo. App. 187, the Kansas City Court of Appeals purported to hold
a gift over void In reliance on Roth v. Rauschenbusch and Gannon v.
Albright, but there was little analysis of the gift and it is not clear
that there was an absolute power of disposal.
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Littel,1 84 in which, tho it was unnecessary to the decision,
they said that a limitation over would be void; it is not clear
that the court thought there was a limitation over, however.
Such were the precedents when in Gibson v. Gibson,1 85 Roy,
C., sought to clear away the confusion of the decisions and to
establish the rule of Walton v. Drumtra; but the actual facts
did not warrant the attempt, for the first taker was made a trustee
for those later entitled and there was no limitation after a fee
with added power of disposal. The result of Gibson v. Gibson
ought not to have been different if the first taker had been held
to have had the fee, and in spite of the court's statement that
she took but a life estate it would seem that she must have had
a fee in order to carry out her duties as trustee. Gibson v. Gibson,
therefore, settled nothing and the review of the decisions was
apparently made without appreciation of the real issue around
which the conflict had raged.1 8 6
This completes a review of the cases. It is submitted that
only three of the decisions cannot be rested upon some other
ground than the impossibility of a valid executory limitation after
a fee with added power of disposal-those three are Green v. Sutton, Cornwell v. Wulff,1 8 7 and Roth v. Rauschenbusch. Of these
the opinion in Green v. Sutton is by no means clear and at least
one of judges may have rested the result on the failure of a contingent remainder because the contingency had not happened dur184. (1908) 213 Mo. 589. Fox, J., took part and concurred.
185. (1911) 239 Mo. 490. The case was decided by division number two, composed of judges none of whom had participated in the
former cases on this topic.
186. In Burnet v. Burnet (1912) 244 Mo. 491, the first taker was
held to have but a life estate. In Freeman v. Maxwell (1914) 262 Mo.
13, the first taker was not given a power of disposal, tho the trustee
was authorized to use the legacy for the support of the first taker.
The court held that the first taker had only a life interest and WILt AMs, C., said obiter, "Some of the cases cited hold that a remainder
over, after what purports to be a devise of the fee, is void. But that
is no longer the law of this state, as will appear from a reading of
the case of Gibson v. Gibson, wherein the Missouri cases on the subject are reviewed and some of the cases cited by appellant are expressly overruled." This statement, it is submitted, is grossly inaccurate.
187. Cornwell v. Orton might also be included, but it is part of the
same litigaion as Cornwell v. Wulff.
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ing the existence of the particular estate; l s s and Cornwell v.
Wulff has been expressly overruled upon a ground which would
unquestionably have left the limitation over valid. This leaves
Roth v. Rauschenbusch,'s D which was decided by only two judges
and which has since been disapproved on another ground."' Opposed to Green v. Sutton and Roth v. Rauschenbusch are Straat v.
Uhrig, and the clear dicta in Jecko v. Taussig and Gaven v. Allen.
In view of this situation, is it too late to ask why there should
be a rule that an executory limitation following a fee with added
power of disposal is void? It is not a rule of construction adopted
to effectuate intentions, but a rule of law, the avowed purpose of
which is to defeat intentions. We have got rid of the rule in
Shelley's Case-why has this artificial rule been invented? If testators' and grantors' intentions must be defeated by this rule, there
ought to be some good reason for it. Yet no reason has ever
been given by the Missouri court beyond the statement that the
limitation over would be "inconsistent" or repugnant with an absolute estate given to the first taker. But every shifting executory
limitation is likewise inconsistent or repugnant. When pressed for
a better reason the court harks back to Chancellor Kent and to
Ide v. Ide, 191 Jackson v. Bull19 2 and Jackson v. Robins.'2 3 The
American cases have been so thoroly analyzed by Professor
Gray 194 that'it would be useless to attempt any further exposition
of them. Apparently the Missouri court has never seen Professor
Gray's analysis, tho it has been cited in numerous modern treatises
and decisions.
188. Vide infra, note 158.
189. Young v. Robinson (1906) 122 Mo. App. 187, might also be
enumerated, since it follows Roth v. Rauschenbusch.
190. In Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo. 490.
191. Ide v. Ide (1809) 5 Mass. 500 was decided solely on the authority of Attorney General v. Hall (1731) Fitz 114, which, as Professor Gray has shown, the court misread. Attorney General v. Hall was
cited by the Missouri court in Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo. 490,
where the gift over was miscalled a remainder.
192. (1813) 10 Johns. 19.
193. (1819) 16 Johns. 537. Also reported in 15 Johns. 169.
194. 'Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 67 et seq. See
also the valuable study by Edward Brooks, Jr., in 32 American Law
Register, N. s., p. 1035; and another by B. M. Thompson, in 1 Michigan
Law Review 427, commented on in 16 Harvard Law Review 458.
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Chancellor Kent' 9 5 gave the reason for this rule to be that
"an executory devise cannot be prevented or defeated by any
alteration of the estate out of which, or after which it is limited." '19 6 It will be admitted that since the famous decision of
Pells v. Brown197 executory devises are not destructible as are
contingent remainders; i. e., they are not in their nature destructible interests, and if the first taker is not specially given a power
to destroy the executory limitation he certainly cannot do so
But what is there in! reason or in policy to prevent the creator of
the estate from conferring on the first taker the power to destroy
a subsequent limitation? And if it be conceded that this cannot
be done, were it not more logical to say that the power of destruction is bad instead of saying that the gift over is void?
Nor does there seem to be any valid objection to the gift over
on the ground that it deprives the first taker's fee of one of its
necessary incidents, viz., descent to the heirs in case of intestacy ;198 for this would invalidate an executory limitation over
on the death of the first taker without issue where no power of
disposal had been conferred, yet in such cases the gift over is
unquestionably good. 199 A gift over by way of forfeiture upon
alienation in a certain manner may be void on account of the
public policy which demands free alienation of property ;200 but
this ought not to invalidate gifts on a failure to alienate.
A special reason may exist for holding gifts over of personal
chattels void, where the first taker has an absolute power of disposal, viz., the uncertainty of the exent of the gift over and the
difficulty of determining what is given over.2 01 The American
195. In Jackson v. Robins (1819) 16 Johns. 537, 589. See also 4
Kent, Commentaries, p. 270.
196. See a defense of this statement in 2 Reeves, Real Property,
§ 954, note; and a criticism of it in Tiffany, Real Property, § 140, note.
197. (1620) Cro. Jac. 590.
198. This reason was suggested by FRY, J., in Shaw v. Ford (1877)
7 Ch. Div. 669, 673.
199. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 63.
200. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 55.
201. This reason was adopted in several English cases. See
Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 58. Professor Gray suggests that some reason may be found for the rule inasmuch as it protects the creditors of the first taker. § 74g. The Alabama statute
which validates the gift over seems to make an exception in favor of
creditors of the first taker. Cf. Hood v. Bramlett (1895) 105 Ala. 660.
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cases have not gone upon this ground, however, but have treated
gifts of personalty as governed by the same considerations which
apply to realty.2° 2 It is obvious that the reason of uncertainty
applies as well where the first taker is limited to a life interest,
and is given a power of disposal, yet no one questions the validity
of the gift over in this latter case.
In spite of its having no good reason to support it
and of its operating to defeat intentions which are now
so zealously sought to be effectuated, the rule has a firm hold in
England 2 °3 and in many states in this country. 20 4 The authorities
are not unanimous, 20 5 however, and many judges have condemned it.200

Is it possible for relief from this artificial rule to be secured
without action of the legislature? The stability of titles demands
continuity of decision with reference to rules concerning property.
However, there is a difference between declaring void what was
previously valid and declaring valid what was previously void,
and the latter may be done when the former would be improper
202. But cf. Mills v. Newberry (1885) 112 IlL. 123 and the comment upon it in Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 171.
203. Holmes v. Godson (1856) 8 De G. M. & G. 152; Shaw v. Ford
(1877) 7 Ch. Div. 669; In re Jones (1893) 1 Ch. 438. More recent
cases are collected in I Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) p. 562. But see Doe
v. Glover (1845) 1 C. B. 448. The rule does not seem to obtain in the
Scotch law. Cf. Barston v. Black (1868) Scotch & Divorce App. 392.
204. Williams v. Elliott (1910) 246 Ill. 548; Foster v. Smith
(1892) 156 Mass. 378; Fisher v. Wister (1893) 154 Pa. St. 65; Hoxsey v. Hoxsey (1883) 37 N. 3. Eq. 21; Law v. Douglass (1899) 107
Iowa 606; Howard v. Carusi (1883) 109 U. S. 725; Mulvane v. Rude
(1896) 146 Ind. 476; In re Condon's Estate (Iowa, 1914) 149 N. W. 264.
205. See contra to the rule, Andrews v. Roye (1860) 12 Rich.
536; Hubbard v. Rawson (1855) 4 Gray 242. The rule is condemned
In a recent comment on the Iowa cases in 1 Iowa Law Bulletin 87.

also 16 Harvard Law Review 458.

See

In New York, a statute apparently

designed to prevent the destruction of contingent remainders has been

seised upon to justify a departure from Jackson v. Robins. See Matter of Cager (1888) 111 N. Y. 343; Leggett v. Firth (1892) 132 N. Y.
7; Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 70. A statute of Alabama
expressly validates the limitation over except where it may injure
creditors of or purchasers from the first taker. Alabama Code of 1907,
§ 3424; Hood v. Bramlett (1895) 105 Ala. 660, 17 So. 105.
206. PECKIHAM, J., in Greyston v. Clark (1886) 41 Hun 125, 130,
speaks of it as "a wholly artificial rule, founded neither upon any
public policy or sound reasoning." Cf., Easton v. Straw (1846) 18 N. H.
320. It is clear that Roy, C., in Gibson v. Gibson (1911) 239 Mo. 490, disapproved the rule.
4
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short of legislative action. The rule of Green v. Sutton and of
Roth v. Rouschenbusch, because of the confidence with which so
many judges have repeated it, has probably been accepted by the
bar and frequently acted upon; but reliance upon this rule has
usually taken the form either of refraining from making limitations over following absolute powers of disposal, or of clearly
limiting the first taker to a life estate. To this extent, an abandonment of the rule by the courts will cause no inconvenience for
it will simply change the practice of lawyers as to future instruments. In the unusual case in. which such a limitation over has
been made in spite of the rule, the heirs of the first taker may
have been advised that they could hold in spite of the limitation
over; but with the vacillation in the decisions of the Supreme
Court for over thirty years20 7 on the question as to when the first
taker has but a life estate with the limitation over good as a remainder, it is improbable that many lawyers have advised clients
who would benefit by the limitation over to acquiesce in the holding by the heirs of the first taker; and this conclusion is borne out
by the fact that there has been such a mass of litigation on this
subject in recent years. It is submitted that little, if any, inconvenience would be caused in such cases by a judicial abandonment of the rule. Nor would inconvenience be caused to purchasers from the first takers, for after they have benefitted by the
powers of disposal the limitations over are necessarily defeated.
A big advantage can be achieved by the courts' abandoning
this artificial rule. The mass of litigation on the question of when
the first taker has but a life estate would be- very greatly reduced, 20 8 and the court would have put itself beyond the temptation to find a life estate to have been created where no intention
appears to so limit it-the temptation to which it so plainly
yielded in McMillan v. Farrow, Walton v. Drumtra, and Under207. Since the decision of Bean v. Kemmur (1885) 86 Mo. 660.
208. See Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 74a. The
question would continue to arise with reference to dower and curtesy:
if the first taker has but a life estate, his wife has no dower; but if
he has a fee, his wife has dower in spite of the limitation over. Vida
inlra, note 101,
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wood v. Cave.20 9 A more positive advantage would be the effectuation of testators' and grantors' intentions whether expressed
in the one or the other form, i. e., whether the first taker has a life
estate or a fee, and the ridding of our law of a formal and arbitrary rule which serves no good purpose and which, like the rule
in Shelley's Case and the rule as to indefinite failures of issue, of
both of which the legislature has relieved us, only fetters a wholly
reasonable and proper disposition of property.
IV

SUMMARY

The results of this survey of the present position of executory limitations in Missouri law may be summarized by stating
the various 'types of cases in which the questions have arisen and
are likely to arise.
I.

A, having an estate of inheritance in Blackacre, devises it
1. To B and his heirs with a proviso tlmat if C is admitted to the bar the land shall go to C and his heirs. C has
a valid, contingent, shifting, executory devise.
2. To B and his heirs with a proviso that at the end
of twenty years the land shall go to C and his heirs. C has
a valid, certain, shifting, executory devise.
3. To B and his heirs from and after ten years after
A's death.
B has a valid, certain, springing, executory
devise.
4. To B and his heirs from and after the date of C's
admission to the bar. B has a valid, contingent, springing,
executory devise.
5. To B for life (or years) and from and after ten
years after B's death to C and his heirs. C has a valid,
certain, springing, executory devise.
209. (1903) 176 Mo. 1. Real Injury is inflicted by such a misconstruction of gifts in that the spouse of the first taker is deprived
of dower or curtesy, and the first taker as a life tenant may be liable
for waste.
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II. A, having an estate of inheritance in Blackacre, conveys
it by bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, or a common
law method of conveyance to uses,
1. To B and his heirs with a proviso that if C is admitted to the bar the land shall go to C and his heirs. C
has a contingent, shifting, executory interest which is probably valid in Missouri.
2. To B and his heirs with a proviso tnat at the end
of twenty years the land shall go to C and his heirs. C has
a certain, shifting, executory interest, whicn is probably
valid in Missouri.
3. To B and his heirs from and after A's death. B
has a valid, certain, future interest which will .probably be
upheld as a remainder, Dozier v. Toalson, but which should
be treated as a springing, executory interest.
4. To B and his heirs to take effect upon A's death. B
takes nothing. Goodale v. Evans, but cf., Wimpey v. Ledford.
5. To B and his heirs from and after C's admission to
the bar. B has a valid, contingent, springing, executory interest. O'Day v. Meadows.
6. To the heirs of B, a living person. The heirs of B
should have a valid, contingent, springing, executory interest;
but quaere.
7. To B for life (or years) and from and after ten
years after B's death to C and his heirs. C has a certain,
springing, executory interest which is probably valid in Missouri.
III. A, having an estate of inheritance in Blackacre, conveys
it by statutory grant or by a method of conveyance good at common law and not operating under the statute of uses. The same
results will follow as in II, except for the additional doubt as to
the applicability of the statute concerning freeholds in futuro to
the shifting interests in II, 1 and 2.
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A, having a term for years in Blackacre, bequeaths it
1. To B with a proviso that if C is admitted to the
bar the term shall go to C and his heirs. C has a valid, contingent, shifting, executory interest. Manning's Case.
2. To B with a proviso that at the end of twenty years
the term shall go to C and his heirs. C has a valid, certain,
shifting, executory interest.
3. To B from and after ten years after A's death. B
has a valid, certain, springing, executory interest.
4. To B for life and after his death to C and his heirs.
B takes the whole term subject to C's valid, certain, shifting,
executory interest.
5. To B for life and from and after ten years after
his death to C and his heirs. B takes the whole term
which his administrator may hold until ten years after B's
death when it will shift to C and his heirs.
IV.

V. A, having a term for years in Blackacre, assigns it
1. To B with a proviso that if C is admitted to the bar
the term shall belong to C and his heirs. Quaere.
2. To X in trust for B with a proviso that if C is admitted to the bar in trust for C. C has a valid, contingent,
shifting, equitable interest. Straat v. Uhrig.
3. To B from and after the death of A. Quaere.
4. To X in trust for B after the death of A. B has a
valid, certain, springing, equitable interest.
A, having a picture, bequeaths it
1. To B with a proviso that if B dies without issue
surviving him it shall belong to C. C takes nothing. State
ex rel. Haines v. Tolson.
2. To B with a proviso that if C is admitted to the
bar it shall belong to C. Quaere.
3. To X in trust for B but if C is admitted to the bar
in trust for C. C's contingent, shifting, equitable interest is
probably good.
4. To B for life and then to C. C has a valid remainder. State ex rel. Farley v. Welsh.

VI.
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VII. A, having a picture, transfers it by deed
1. To B with a proviso that if B dies without issue
surviving him it shall belong to C. C takes nothing. Wilson
v. Cockrell.
2. Same as VI, 2.
3. Same as VI, 3.
4. To B for life and then to C. C has a valid remainder.,
5. To B from and after next Christmas. B has a springing, executory interest which is probably good.
VIII. A, having a cask of wine, bequeaths or transfers it
to B. Any gift over is void because the use of the wine will necessarily mean its consumption.
IX. A devises or conveys land, or bequeaths or transfers
personal chattels
1. To B for life with power to pass an absolute title
by deed or will, and in the event of his failure to exercise
the power to C and his heirs. C has a valid remainder which
is vested subject to being divested by B's exercise of the
power. (There is some danger that C's remainder will be
held to be contingent.) Jecko v. Taussig.
2. To B and his heirs with a proviso that if B does
not seek admission to the bar then the property is to go to C
and his heirs. The gift over is not bad by reason of B's power
to defeat it by seeking admission to the bar.
3. To B and his heirs with power to pass an absolute
title by deed or will and if B remarries (or dies without issue)
then to C and his heirs. The limitation over is probably not
void by reason of the power given to B. Cf., Gaven v. Allen.
4. To B with power to pass an absolute title by deed
or will and in event of his failure to exercise the power then
to C and his heirs. B will probably be held to have a life
estate and C a vested remainder which may be divested by B's
exercise of the power. Walton v. Drumtra.
5. To B in fee (or if personalty, absolutely) with
power to pass an absolute title by deed or will and in the event
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of his failure to exercise the power then to C and his heirs. C
takes nothing because of the power given to B. Roth v.
Rauschenbusch. Cf., Green v. Sutton.
X. A, having a term for years, assigns it to X in trust for
B who is given a general power to dispose of it absolutely, and
in the event of B's failure to exercise the power in trust for C.
C has a valid, contingent, shifting, equitable interest. Straat v.
Uhrig.
MANLEY 0. HUDSON

